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ABSTRACT 
A study investigating what factors are present leading to pilots submitting voluntary anomaly 
reports regarding their flight performance was conducted. The study employed statistical methods, 
text mining, clustering, and dimensional reduction techniques in an effort to determine relationships 
between factors and anomalies. A review of the literature was conducted to determine what factors 
are contributing to these anomalous incidents, as well as what research exists on human error, its 
causes, and its management. 
Data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was analyzed using 
traditional statistical methods such as frequencies and multinomial logistic regression. Recently 
formalized approaches in text mining such as Knowledge Based Discovery (KBD) and Literature 
Based Discovery (LBD) were employed to create associations between factors and anomalies. These 
methods were also used to generate predictive models. Finally, advances in dimensional reduction 
techniques identified concepts or keywords within records, thus creating a framework for an 
unsupervised document classification system. 
Findings from this study reinforced established views on contributing factors to civil aviation 
anomalies. New associations between previously unrelated factors and conditions were also found. 
Dimensionality reduction also demonstrated the possibility of identifying salient factors from 
unstructured text records, and was able to classify these records using these identified features.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The demand for worldwide air travel continues to increase. In addition, the business model 
of commercial aviation is continually evolving, with more direct flights between city-pairs on smaller 
aircraft replacing more traditional ―spoke and hub‖ operations where large aircraft connect major 
cities, thus requiring de-boarding and connecting flights on smaller aircraft. The changing 
operational environment comprises longer flight times between city-pairs, increased aircraft 
capability and complexity, and more airplane traffic, all of which, taken together, create many 
opportunities for anomalous events. 
Accidents in day-to-day aviation operations are rare. However, aircraft anomalies occur 
much more frequently. These anomalies mimic conditions that lead to accidents. Understanding 
what factors are present and how they are associated with anomalies can lead to methods aimed at 
reducing or otherwise managing factors before they lead to serious incidents. 
Nagel (1988) reports that 90 percent of aviation mishaps are labeled as and attributed to 
human error. Studies conducted by Lautman and Gallimore (1987) report that about 70 percent of 
accidents in commercial jet transport can be attributed to crew error. This percentage is consistent 
over any time period under review, and has not changed in recent times despite implementations of 
new technologies and findings from human factors and related safety disciplines. An understanding 
of what factors are present when anomalous events occur will strongly aid in managing or 
preventing future anomalies. 
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Transportation Safety Board 
(NSTB) keep detailed accident reports of commercial aircraft incidents, in an effort to use 
knowledge gleaned from such incidents to prevent future problems. Analysis of this data using 
methods from the fields of traditional statistical analysis, human factors studies, clustering, and 
dimensionality reduction may yield new information on causes and provide insights into what 
conditions are present for similar error types. This information may be used to influence design, 
training, or operations that have the potential to further reduce error. 
Today‘s high performance computers and the vast storage capabilities of these computers 
constitute unprecedented opportunities for data creation and archiving. Many accident and incident 
databases exist, yet pertinent information may be overlooked in all of these data. Methods are 
required to reduce the dimensionality and ―noise‖ in all of these data while leaving relevant 
structural information intact. 
Maintaining vast stores of information is only useful if this information is organized and 
retrievable when needed. Classifying the data using human operators is tedious and possibly 
inaccurate, as two individuals may classify the same record differently. Semi-supervised and 
unsupervised accurate, reliable classification algorithms and applications would greatly increase the 
value of maintaining vast data stores of incident or anomaly data. 
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P r o b l e m  S t a t e m e n t  
Through advancements in training, hardware, and regulations, aviation accident rates have 
declined drastically since data began being formally collected in the 1950s and 1960s. However, rates 
of decreases in aviation accidents have slowed noticeably in the past 30 years. Human and 
mechanical contributions to accidents are routinely studied and classified. 
Accidents are seemingly rare when viewed in light of the many safe flights completed every 
day. Aircraft anomalous events however, are more numerous. The causal factors contributing to 
these anomalies are not widely understood, though the conditions surrounding anomalies are often 
identical to those surrounding accidents. Surveying the more plentiful anomaly data will yield 
valuable insights as to what factors contribute to the occurrence of aircraft anomalous events. 
Understanding these factors can lead to improved management of said factors, and in turn, provide 
additional insight into how to further decrease the rate of accidents. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A c c i d e n t  D a t a b a s e s  
The FAA maintains databases on multiple aspects of the National Airspace System (NAS) 
(Hendricks, 1987). The databases are employed to identify potential areas of concern, and to drive 
recommendations for improvement. A significant element of this system is the human performance 
and human factors portion. The FAA databases concerned with human error are the near midair 
collisions (NMACs), pilot deviations, and operational errors. 
The NMAC database tracks near collisions and categorizes them according to severity, with 
the highest speed, smallest distance between aircraft scoring the highest level of severity. These 
classifications, however, can be highly subjective, and reporting of incidents is voluntary. Pilots may 
not report collisions for fear of penalty. There also appears to be a lack of causal factor information. 
An interesting development stemming from NMA data is that the number of reports has steadily 
increased – likely due to increasing traffic – though the level of actual collisions has remained 
consistent for the study period (1977-1986). 
The pilot deviation (PD) database tracks those incidents where a Federal Air Regulation 
(FAR) was violated or some bounding area or interdiction zone was crossed. The PD database is an 
information store, and little causal information exists. 
The Operational Error (OE) database tracks occurrences related to ATC shortcomings 
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where appropriate separation between aircraft is violated. 
A fourth database, maintained by NASA, is called the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS). This is a voluntary self-report system to which pilots who experience aviation incidents, 
accidents, mishaps, or close calls can submit reports of the incident. The data is then complied and 
analyzed for the purpose of improving the national aviation system. The purpose of the collection of 
the incident reports is to decrease the likelihood of future aviation accidents through a "lessons-
learned" approach. 
One of the factors differentiating the ASRS system is its voluntary report nature. Reports are 
completely anonymous; the original report data is destroyed after entry into the electronic database, 
thereby further protecting the identity of the report-maker. Reports are not compulsory to file even 
in the event of an incident. In addition, the FAA has agreed to not use ASRS information in its own 
enforcement activities and investigations, and even to waive fines and penalties (with certain 
exceptions) for unintentional violations of regulations reported to ASRS. Another defining 
characteristic of the ASRS database is its narrative section, which includes both a section written by 
the individual making the report as well as a synopsis written by an analyst. 
H u m a n  E r r o r  M o d e l s  
One of the most popular approaches to human error analysis and modeling is the cognitive 
perspective. This approach likens the human mind to an information processing system. Inputs 
from the senses are integrated and transformed into behavior. Many types of cognitive models exist, 
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though some models are better suited for certain elements of cognition than others. The models 
attempt to break down human behavior into discrete processing steps and identify at which step an 
error occurred, allowing for classification and management of the error. A contrasting perspective, 
to illustrate the concept, is that of the behavioral perspective. The behavioral perspective views 
human performance in terms of rewards and the avoidance of unpleasant situations or admonitions 
from superiors (Skinner, 1974). Neither perspective can explain all of human behavior, but they 
model and shed light on various aspects. 
The fields of psychology, cognitive science, human factors, and safety science all have 
different methods of classifying and managing various errors. Errors are important because of their 
possible drastic effects on human reliability and performance, which directly affect manned system 
reliability and performance. Rasmussen (1983) clearly states the need for predicting human 
performance in automated systems, which is due to the high risk involved in the potential for 
accidents given the amount of responsibility now attributed to the automation. The automation 
cannot account for all of the unforeseen states and conditions it may experience. This is why there is 
still a human ―supervisor‖ presiding over the automation, monitoring and intervening as necessary. 
However, like the automated system, the human‘s actions are defined by a set of constraints between 
the environment, actions, and effects. Human actions related to system operation are based on 
internal representations that are based on these constraints. Thus, by defining and representing the 
constraints employed one can categorize and relate various human behaviors (Rasmussen, 1983). 
When human behavior fails to satisfy a goal, the cause is called an error. Errors are viewed as 
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those situations where an intended or planned set of actions does not meet expected outcomes, and 
no chance event could be blamed for the failure of these outcomes (Reason, 1990). Reason further 
defines other types of errors, such as slips and mistakes. Slips occur when an execution fails; the 
planning element is irrelevant to a slip. A mistake, by contrast, does not consider the actual 
execution of desired action; it is the result of improper or incorrect planning. The decisions made 
regarding how to achieve a goal are involved when a mistake occurs, not the execution stage itself. 
Slips are more apparent to the observer, while mistakes are much more subtle and difficult to detect. 
Due to their more complex nature, mistakes can further be classified into two categories: 
failures of expertise, where knowledge is incorrectly applied, and lack of expertise, where necessary 
knowledge does not exist. Rasmussen (1983) divides mistake types into rule-bused and knowledge-
based forms. These error types and their primary areas of occurrence are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Classification of error types, reproduced from Reason (1990) 
Cognitive Stage Primary error type 
Planning Mistakes 
Storage Lapses 
Execution Slips 
 
Rasmussen (1986) has grouped these error types into respective levels of information 
processing. These levels are skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based processing levels and 
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therefore also error types. Slips occur at the skill-based level, where a rehearsed and learned action 
goes awry. Mistakes, on the other hand, are more complex, occurring at either the rule- or 
knowledge-based processing stage. 
These information processing steps can occur in hierarchies or loops for complex processes. 
Different levels of processing can ―stack up,‖ either worsening or improving a situation. For 
example, a healthy adult human walking is employing skill-based processing, as walking is well-
rehearsed at this point in the adult‘s development and is practically automatic from a cognitive 
workload point of view. The adult does not have to actively think and process the actions that 
involve walking. However, should a slip occur and balance become unstable, it can be argued that 
the adult will employ knowledge-based processing, employing sensory feedback information to 
command novel movements to recover balance. Had the adult been studying martial arts or dance 
movements, perhaps these newly learned ―rules‖ of movement could be applied to restore balance, 
as martial arts and dancing moves result in the formation of new ―rules‖ for balance in for new 
students. The preceding example illustrates how skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based processing relate. 
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Figure 1: Relationships between types of errors 
Studies of errors require differing means of investigation. Investigative methods include self-
reporting activities, observation comprising both synchronous and asynchronous methods, and 
various evaluations comprising multiple levels of abstraction and fidelity. 
Sources of Error 
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Many sources of error exist within the aviation domain. Weiner (1987) discusses these 
sources, the first being design-induced error. These errors occur when design of procedures, 
controls, or other interactive elements induce error. For example, handles that activate completely 
different functions yet are placed near each other and are similar in shape can lead to confusion and 
accidental triggering of unwanted aircraft functions. 
Errors occur when outdated or arbitrary naming conventions are given to navigation points. 
Phonetic spellings, unconventional pronunciations, shortened naming conventions and frequent 
"double-checking" of orders and communications between pilots and air traffic controllers all 
increase workload and invite opportunities for error. Pilots unfamiliar with these discrepancies 
would have to check charts or communicate unnecessarily with controllers; both are high-workload 
tasks. 
Errors can happen when meanings are misconstrued, or when intended meanings are not 
interpreted correctly. Weiner (1987) expounds on this by describing an incident where a pilot 
commanded a flight engineer for ―take-off power,‖ which was interpreted as ―take off the power,‖ 
and resulted in the loss of an Air Force C-124. 
Finally, an often-cited contributor to error is ―loss of situational awareness (SA).‖ The term 
situational awareness has been used as a buzzword in the industry, with its formal definition often 
forgotten or obscured. The classic definition of situational awareness has three levels (Endsley, 
1995). 
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1. Level 1 – Perception of appropriate aspects of environment 
2. Level 2 – Understanding how these aspects relate to goals 
3. Level 3 – Ability to predict future states of the environment 
A good pilot always strives to maintain all three levels of SA. Flight training focuses on 
teaching pilots how to scan their environment and instruments for important information. 
Experience, knowledge, and practice hone observational skills to predict performance and constantly 
achieve goals or missions. 
Error Management Methods 
The aviation domain has a rich history of attempting to manage error. The field of Human 
Factors owes its origins to WWII military flight operations. This is largely due to the fact that 
aircraft operation is a very demanding task with many opportunities for error. Flight activities are 
prone to error and high workload because aircraft capabilities far exceed human capabilities. Pilots 
often employ the phrase, "staying ahead of the airplane," meaning that the pilot must plan and be 
ready to respond to changes in aircraft operation. For general aviation, during seemingly uneventful 
cruise flight, the unofficial recommendation is for pilots to stay five minutes "ahead" of the airplane. 
This means that the pilot should know where the airplane will be in five minutes, and what its state 
will be. This practice of predicting future states from current relevant information is often called 
Situational Awareness (SA) (Endsley, 1995). Any unexpected changes call for changes to this plan, 
and will likely shorten the amount of time the pilot can stay "ahead" of the airplane. The opportunity 
for accidents greatly increases when a pilot can no longer predict and manage airplane states, any 
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states such as position, altitude, or even physical configuration of the aircraft control surfaces. 
To mitigate the difficulty of powered flight, pilots are subjected to stringent training 
requirements, including medical tests to determine adequate fitness levels. Commercial pilots have 
increased medical requirements and receive ongoing training to keep their certificates. Many pilot 
aids exist, ranging from simple checklists outlining flight procedures, advanced flight training, and 
automation serving to reduce pilot workload. These aids exist to mitigate and manage opportunities 
for pilot error. 
Aviation during the First World War was extremely dangerous. Investigations made on 
fatalities at the time found that more pilots were lost due to accidents than combat, usually resulting 
from a failure of the airframe itself or, more likely, the propulsion unit (Koonce, 1999). 
The field of Human Factors (HF) was born to mitigate these glaring problems. Early HF 
methods focused on the selection and training of pilots, managing physiological stresses of flight, 
and improvements to the design of equipment to ensure mission success and safety of operation. 
Errors are not completely random, and are not decoupled from conditions related to their 
occurrence. This property means they are classifiable and can have various management methods. 
Human Factors practitioners study human error, and develop methods of controlling it (Edwards 
1998). This process, called error reduction, requires that errors are properly detected and appropriate 
corrections are applied. The difficulty facing researchers and investigators is that evidence and 
causes of human error are not immediately apparent, and often are qualitative in nature. Compared 
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this to the crisp, digital nature of mechanical failures, it is easy to see why it so easy to classify all 
mishaps as ―human error.‖ The example given by Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) is that of a fatigued 
bolt that may have failed, versus a fatigued pilot. Tools and very discrete measures exist to examine 
metal fatigue to a high degree of accuracy, but identifying mental fatigue requires inference and 
knowledge about the person‘s recent activities and rest levels. Quantifying the highly variable human 
is very challenging; there are no discrete reference standards that apply to all humans or an all-
encompassing approach that works for every individual. 
Progress introduced by the fields of Human Factors and associated error management tools 
can be illustrated by the investigations of Engle and Lott (1979) on WWI aviation-related fatality 
data. For each 100 aviation deaths in WWI, 2 came from enemy action, 8 could be attributed to 
aircraft failure, and 90 were caused by individual defects. Of these 90, 60 could be attributed to 
improper training. The main lesson to be learned from these data is that, although technology 
changes and adapts rapidly, the human operators do not. 
Aviation in particular is a practice that demands high reliability. This reliability must be 
present in the hardware as well as the operator. Due to the highly variable nature of humans, the 
resulting difficulty of control and classification of this variability, their role, activities, and needs are 
overlooked in favor of managing the more predictable hardware. Elaborate efforts avoiding human 
considerations are made, which range from improving training and selection and increasing 
automation, to ―designing out the human‖ completely. Modern aircraft have placed pilots in more of 
a supervisory role, they preside over the automatic systems during normal flight and only become 
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directly involved with aircraft control when problems or unexpected situations arise. It is likely these 
situations require actions that have not been practiced, and so errors may occur as the pilot must 
either create new knowledge or recall infrequently accessed knowledge. 
Human error can be managed and attempts are constantly being made to ―design out‖ 
possibilities for human error. These strategies include, but are not limited to, training, hardware 
changes, software optimization, and regulation of activities. These interventions have been shown to 
be effective in increasing safety and reducing error. One example of this is the development of the 
angled aircraft carrier deck (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). This innovation eliminated hazardous 
opportunities for collisions where an aircraft taking off from the bow aborted the take-off while 
another was landing. The angled deck changed the direction of take-off aircraft while others could 
still land safely. An understanding of factors contributing to unsafe conditions, anomalies, or 
accidents was necessary to properly manage the undesirable results. 
Edwards (1988) questions the future role of pilots: should they be ―automated out of the 
system?‖ Humans possess abilities that current computer systems do not have, such as large 
associative memories, abilities to deduce relevant information, and propensity for pattern 
recognition. Modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems attempt to grant this ability to computer 
systems. Already, unmanned, automated flight is possible in military drone systems; just as Edwards 
(1988) described a future where ―ground-based managers supervise several flights in a geographical 
sector or airborne supervisors manage individual flights.‖ 
This supervisory activity of the human has led to the creation of a supervisory control 
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model, consisting of five steps. These control functions were identified and broken down into their 
respective human and automation components by Sheridan (2010). 
Plan
Teach
Monitor
Intervene
Learn
Inform
Learn
Perform
Cooperate
Aid Memory
Human Tasks Automation Tasks
 
Figure 2: Supervisory control framework adapted from Sheridan (2010) 
The five functions that humans perform with the aid of automation are as follows: 
1. Plan – the human must predict and represent the end goal whilst the automation 
relays relevant information to completing the task at hand 
2. Teach – the human must manipulate controls and symbols to create a representation 
of the end goal and completion states that the automation ―understands‖ 
3. Monitor – supervise the execution of the task, subject to intermediate constraints and 
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performance measures, the automation carries out the task 
4. Intervene – when current state variables or conditions to not match those 
prescribed, modify the automation‘s functioning or disconnect it entirely 
5. Learn – develop heuristics, shortcuts, and employ information learned to improve 
future performance; the automation, with its digital storage capacity, aids in relevant 
information retrieval 
At any point in the above figure and list of activities, there may be inconsistencies, 
aberrations, loss of information or complete signal degradation, or outright incorrect information. 
Making generalizations or classifying all-encompassing breakdowns in this process is very difficult, 
due to the varied complexity of automation systems, different levels of pilot training, and multitudes 
of mission states and parameters. 
Precursor Analysis 
Accident investigations are not new practices. Humans naturally are curious and will 
continually pursue determining causes of events. However, precursor analyses can be more effective 
and informative in determining causation. Precursor analysis attempts to investigate prior indicators, 
missed signals, and dismissed alerts that, if heeded, could have prevented the accident. Bird and 
Germain (1996) claim that there are many more precursor events available for analysis than there are 
actual accidents. Precursor analyses are attractive also in the sense that they are performed on an 
intact system, without the added pressures or interference caused by responsible parties with 
something to hide, resource constraints, or unreliable witness accounts (Phimister et al, 2004). The 
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recognition of these precursors clearly benefits safety studies in the sense that actions should be 
taken when such precursors manifest themselves. 
Precursor analysis benefits investigators by exploiting information from near-misses. For 
most accident situations, near-misses occur more frequently than the actual catastrophic event (Bird 
and Germain, 1996). Near-misses often mirror actual accident conditions without the event 
occurring, affording analysis of contributing factors or scenario construction. All precursor analysis 
methods aim to find associations in existing conditions to reveal novel insights into accident causes 
and risk levels. 
There are a few caveats to precursor investigations. Hindsight bias is a condition that occurs 
when individuals who were present at the accident would artificially inflate the risk levels associated 
with conditions at the accident. These individuals likely consider the accident to have been highly 
likely (Hawkins and Hastie, 1990). Precursor analysis could contain many disparate elements; these 
elements may not be given the appropriate attention and level of analysis that is normally reserved 
for accident investigation. Precursors are sometimes dismissed as the ―lessons learned,‖ as their 
application may not be as strong or salient as findings from other types of studies. However, one of 
the most attractive elements of precursor analyses is their low cost as compared to accident 
investigations. Data gleaned from precursor analyses can be used to create or enhance automated 
safety monitoring programs and detectors. Precursor analysis, when planned, defined, and deployed 
properly, can create viable action plans and recommendations to increase safety (Phimister et al, 
2004).  
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T a x o n o m i e s ,  O n t o l o g i e s ,  a n d  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  S c h e m e s  
Taxonomies serve as maps and guides for a group of related concepts. Individual simplified 
elements are mapped and plotted, and relationships are created between them to illustrate similarities 
and dependencies. 
Classifying and organizing concepts makes them easier to work with, as human learning can 
be reduced to matching input patterns to output patterns. When the relationships between concepts 
are easily understood, the pattern matching activity is simplified. As demonstrated by the literature, 
error types can be classified; as aircraft became more complex, the practice of classifying pilot error 
became more prevalent (Stephenson, 1991). Classifying errors can form relationships between 
accident conditions, causes, and management strategies. 
For a classification system to be effective, its outputs should have the same meaning for all 
users of the system (Fleishman et al 1984). That is, more usable classification systems are those 
where higher correlations between elements belonging to the same category reflect actual user 
perceptions of those items. The main goal of this classification is to provide usable and functional 
relationships, affording the creation of previously unknown relationships. Aircraft accident analyses 
that make use of databases use categorical or analytical methods. Categorical analyses group 
accidents by circumstances, while analytical analyses describe causal factors. 
When classifying records, measures of performance are required to ensure and indicate 
reliable classification. One such measure of classification reliability is Cohen‘s kappa, which measures 
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levels of agreement between classifying agents as compared to chance. The range of the kappa 
coefficient is 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect reliability. Acceptable levels of kappa range from 0.6 to 
0.74; systems should strive for a value of 0.6 or better, with values over 0.8 deemed "excellent." 
A taxonomy related to errors was created by Swain and Guttman (1983). Their research 
investigated accidents at nuclear power plants. The categories created were: 
1. Errors of omission are those errors where an individual omits the entire task or 
omits a step in the task. These errors are failures to perform an action. 
2. Errors of Commission are errors that are due primarily to poor selection. The 
individual selects a wrong control incorrectly, incorrectly manipulates said control, or 
issues an incorrect command or input. 
3. Errors of Sequence are errors caused by actions that are performed out of the proper 
sequential order. 
4. Errors of Timing are errors caused by actions that are either too early or too late. 
Classifying error from accident reports and creating data on error counts can provide 
insights into error causes, and from these data strategies on error prevention can be created. 
Furthermore, these taxonomies can be linked directly to organizational processes. 
There are various methods of data analysis to use when creating taxonomies. These range 
from technically rational approaches that look through the data, to exploratory approaches that look 
at the data (Wallace and Ross, 2006). Information sources do not matter to the taxonomy creation 
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process; it must only be of sufficient quality to be analyzable. Analyzing rare and large-scale single 
events such as catastrophes may not reveal the most useful information as such incidents are not 
typical or representative of reality. General patterns and results can only be visible when large 
numbers of data points are analyzed. 
Databases containing short reports or data can only be used effectively if classified reliably. 
In an applied setting, a database containing short accident reports (such as the ASRS) is only useful 
if the coding and classification of the reports would be coded the same way by different people (or 
rules). If no consensus exists in how the data are classified, then the amount of noise in the database 
would quickly diminish its usefulness. Wallace and Ross (2006) investigated the reliability of coding 
in a database for nuclear root cause event studies. They found that by sampling previously coded 
reports, three experienced coders had a reliability of 42 percent, where less than half of the coders 
applied the same codes to the previously coded reports. These findings emphasize the importance of 
a robust taxonomy and classification scheme. 
Jarvis and Harris (2010) created a custom human factors taxonomy for inexperienced glider 
pilots involved in accidents. Fifty-nine categories of accident causes attributable to the pilot were 
created, grouped into HF elements such as judgment, handling, strategy, and attention. These topics 
were then linked to specific, non-general flight tasks such as approach control and failure to judge 
distances when flaring. Another outcome of the creation of this taxonomy was that inexperienced 
pilots had more accidents across all general HF elements except for "strategy," possibly implying 
that training or safety management should focus on other HF elements. 
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A taxonomy created by Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) outlines broad categories for 
intervention of error. This taxonomy eventually led to the creation of the Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS). 
1. Environment - control of temperature, noise, vibration, lighting 
2. Human - personnel selection, incentives, training, teamwork, communication 
3. Machine - engineering design, capacity 
4. Task - ordering or timing of events, procedures, standardization 
Latent failures are defined as already existing, and they usually comprise contributing factors. 
Reason (1990) defines latent failures as inadequate training programs, fatigue, or negligent 
supervision. Active failures are those that contribute to the incident at the time of occurrence, such 
as reduced perceptual ability or skipping an item on a checklist. These failures "add up" or all come 
together to contribute to a major accident or incident. Reason (1990) illustrates this using an analogy 
popularly referred to as the "Swiss cheese" model. 
The Swiss cheese model's cheese slices depict accident or error prevention factors, while the 
holes in the cheese represent failures or inabilities to manage given conditions. The model illustrates 
that, under everyday normal "operations" -- be they aviation, engineering, construction, or even 
primal behaviors such as self-preservation -- certain latent safeguards are in place to prevent failures 
or errors. When these latent and active conditions are performing properly, conditions leading to 
error are unable to pass through. There are also active behaviors or actions at work at any given 
moment. However, these latent and active conditions may contain aberrations or complete lacks or 
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deficiencies, and, given the appropriate combination and interaction of these failures, a dangerous 
condition may pass through all of these safeguards. 
Incident
―Cheese Blocks‖ Represent 
defenses (both inherent and 
intentional) against failures 
or errors
Holes represent absent of 
failed defense elements
Set of Latent Factors A
Set of Latent Factors B
Set of Latent Factors C
Active Factors or 
Conditions
 
Figure 3: Swiss cheese model of latent and active failures (Adopted from Reason, 1990) 
The model reminds investigators and analysts that the blame for an accident cannot always 
be attributed to one area, or worse, one person. Inherent safety problems can start much higher up 
than at the operations level: the holes in the cheese model may be introduced by management, 
maintenance, or design engineering even prior to operation. These inadequacies may be more 
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dangerous than operator error (Reason & Viale, 2006). 
The classification system employs four tiers, with three tiers involving latent failures, and one 
tier describing active failures of prevention. The three latent failure tiers describe existing conditions. 
The first tier describes how organizational policies may provide opportunities for decreased 
preventative measures (more holes in the "cheese") in the form of flawed break or rest policies, the 
lack of a safety-oriented culture, or undue focus on performance. 
Unsafe supervisory practices can range from unreasonable organizational pressures, to lack 
of policy enforcement, to decreasing safety standard monitoring. 
Preconditions for unsafe acts include such problems as decreased mental states resulting 
from fatigue, or discord emanating from personal problems. Supervisors may contribute to 
dangerous situations by failing to intervene when individuals argue or fight habitually. Such long-
term animosities between employees may eventually end violently. 
The final, ―active‖ tier classifies operator behavior into either errors resulting from the types 
previously described, or by willful violations of procedures. Violations are further split into those 
that are routine or minor. Minor violations are not large deviations from established protocols, and 
usually habitual and not enforced by management, while major or exceptional violations as a result 
of their drastic nature, usually result in the death of the operator or large-scale destruction of 
equipment. 
One example of a minor violation would be speeding in an automobile, exceeding the speed 
24 
limit by 5-10 percent. It is important to note that routine violations may actually be condoned by 
management. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many state troopers will not stop a vehicle travelling 
5-10 miles per hour over the speed limit, as studies show such drivers are more alert due to their 
constant attention to the fact they are violating the speed limit. Driving at double or triple the posted 
speed limit would constitute an exceptional violation, as incidents or losses of control at such speeds 
are usually fatal. 
Wiegmann & Shappell (2003) created the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS). HFACS employs a systematic approach that encompasses both latent and active failures 
that lead to an incident (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
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Figure 4: HFACS taxonomy breakdown 
HFACS has already been employed to analyze incidents in the commercial aviation industry, 
including an investigatory period between 1990 and 1996. The results of the investigation defied 
expectations and common understandings of aviation accidents. Flight training at small flight 
schools and large institutions such as Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, as well as FAA 
initiatives, has long drawn upon Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM), as "the wrong choice" has 
often been thought to be the greatest contributing factor to accidents. However, Wiegmann and 
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Shappell (2001) found that close to 60 percent of aircrew-related accidents were due to skill-based 
errors. In their study, the proportion of accidents attributable to decision-errors was less than 30 
percent. Perceptual errors were not commonly accounted for in the study of 119 accidents, as only 
17 of the accidents studied contained perceptual error. Upon further inspection, this idea should not 
be surprising. Much of everyday human life, including the operation of machinery, tends to be 
largely automatic, stemming from learned or trained behaviors (Boquet et al, 2004). Using this 
thought process, it is logical to conclude that the bulk of incidents will occur when these highly 
rehearsed, automatic behaviors go wrong, simply because they occupy most of human behavior. 
Decisions, by relative comparison, are rare, with the latent preventative factors of training, 
education, and reason providing significant buffers against making the wrong decision. 
HFACS was again employed by Wiegmann and Rantanen (2003) to investigate the 
effectiveness of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). Interestingly, the study concluded that 
current NASA safety intervention strategies target the machine, and not the human, environment, or 
task. Furthermore, almost half of the technologies developed were rated as having little to no effect 
on aircrew error. The study found that only one product was geared towards reducing skill-based 
error - the most common air crew error committed. It also found that no intervening technologies 
addressed civilian air violations in aircraft operation. These are among the many insights that arise 
from categorizing data and investigating relationships between categories. 
Meaningful associations between errors and contributing factors can be made once they have 
been appropriately categorized. Hobbs & Williamson (2003) differentiated between causal accident 
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models that are based on contributing factors, and their approach, which linked specific errors to 
underlying contributing factors. Their study was based in the domain of aviation aircraft 
maintenance. Aircraft maintenance is an interesting field of study as the errors that occur in 
maintenance can be truly latent; they may manifest themselves after much time has passed since the 
error, or when other conditions exist. 
The authors stated that most studies of safety databases report errors and contributing 
factors independently of each other, listing them in separate, unlinked tables. A taxonomy of errors 
based on the Boeing Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) was created to describe the 
terminating condition of each incident. The MEDA tool is a form that aids investigations where 
aircraft maintenance is a contributing factor to the incident or accident. The aim of the MEDA tool 
is to improve aircraft maintenance operations by removing the contributing factors that lead to the 
incident. It departs from traditional investigations by not being solely focused on assigning blame 
and punitive measures, departing significantly from  traditional accident investigations and 
alterations to current policies, which end immediately after the technician found to be at fault is 
punished (Rankin & Allen, 1996). Without change to company policies, the contributing factors that 
led to the maintenance incident still exist, and can cause similar incidents in the future because ―the 
system is still broken.‖ 
The Hobbs & Williamson (2003) contributing factors taxonomy employed the items in the 
below table:  
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Table 2: Factors contributing to maintenance error Hobbs & Williamson (2003) 
Factor Definition 
Fatigue Inability to function at optimal levels, due to lack of rest or other 
physical or mental deficiency 
Pressure Increased expectations induced by management or situational 
conditions, shortened time available for work 
Coordination Incorrect, inadequate, or lack of communication and integration 
between team members 
Training Shortcomings in education and familiarity with work processes 
Supervision Improper, lack, or inadequate control of workers by management 
Previous Deviation Unsatisfactory work from a prior occurrence; error remained and was 
not reported or recorded 
Procedures Unsuitably designed, documented, not properly shared or not 
adequately enforced standard 
Equipment Poorly designed, maintained, or apparent lack of tools or other 
necessary implements or aids for task performance 
Environment Physical surroundings of the worker that are beyond his or her 
control - lighting levels, noise, temperature, etc. 
Physiological Biological problems stemming from medical conditions or individual 
limitations 
 
The resulting error taxonomy used in the Hobbs & Williamson (2003) study was loosely 
based on familiar taxonomies created by Reason (1990), Wiegmann & Shappell, (2001), and added 
one category called "mischance," where a seemingly "correct" procedure was followed. This action 
created an unsafe condition because the procedure was incorrect or otherwise flawed.  
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Table 3: Errors encountered during maintenance operations Hobbs & Williamson (2003) 
Error Definition 
Perceptual Error A failure to detect a symbol or sign 
Memory Lapse Omission of an intended action 
Slip Failure of the performance of a routine, highly trained and automatic 
procedure 
Rule-Based Error Failure to employ familiar process used in processes already 
experienced or trained 
Violation Intentional deviation from standards 
Knowledge-Based Error Error resulting from inadequate or incomplete knowledge of a task 
Mischance Correct procedures were followed but behavior still lead to 
anomalous occurrence 
 
After the development of the two taxonomies was complete, cross tabulations of errors and 
contributing factors were calculated. Relationships between the categorical variables were 
determined using correspondence analyses as documented by Clausen (1998). Logistic regression 
analyses were used to estimate association strength between contributing factors and each error type. 
The most prevalent associations found were those links between memory lapses and fatigue, and 
between rule violations and time pressure. 
Concept Maps 
Concept maps are similar to taxonomies. However, they describe the relationships between 
concepts with more detail. Terms such as, "is a part of," "gives rise to," or "results in" aid in 
visualizing and relating data. Concept maps are hierarchical in nature, with a main concept at the top 
of the map, and related elements and sub elements linked downward on the concept map page 
(Novak & Cañas 2006). 
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Figure 5: Concept maps: reproduced from Wikipedia Concept Maps (2010) 
Concept maps are usually organized around a focus question, and this focus creates the 
context for the map. Concept maps were developed in 1972 as a tool to understand the evolution of 
a child's knowledge of science (Novak & Musonda, 1991). 
S y s t e m s  T h i n k i n g  
Technological advancement brings with it complexity. This complexity is afforded by 
systems – namely, elements are grouped together as systems, each performing a designated function. 
These complex systems comprise many interrelated components. Though advantageous and even 
necessary, systems, and Systems of Systems (SoS), can bring about previously impossible and 
inconceivable failures due to their highly coupled nature (Perrow, 1984). 
The systems approach bounds an element of reality into identifiable parts and examines the 
interaction between these parts (Sheridan, 1988). The art of systems thinking is found in the 
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appropriate bounding of the system: bounds can result in systems that are trivial for real-world 
application or simply too complex for analysis, not unlike the problem of model development in 
simulation practices. Appropriate bounding and filtering of system elements depend on the purpose 
of investigation. The power of the systems approach comes from this bounding property, its 
iterative nature, and visualization ability. 
One systems model conceived by Edwards (1972) is the SHEL model. The SHEL model is 
used when applying Human Factors principles towards design. The components of this model are: 
1. Software – rules, regulations, laws, operating procedures and general methods of 
organization and implementation of information comprises the software component 
2. Hardware – physical equipment, buildings, vehicles and materials 
3. Environment – surrounding conditions, be they physical, social, political, or 
economic factors where the other resources are employed 
4. ―Liveware‖ – human beings, their capabilities, limitations, and performance measures 
All of these components have interfaces with each other, with environment encompassing 
the other three. Each interface is discussed and it is the job of the human factors practitioner to 
optimize these interactions. Good interfaces likely prevent error, especially when control or 
information must be passed between SHEL model components. 
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Figure 6: SHEL Model 
The Liveware-Hardware and Liveware-Software interfaces are critical to aviation. Buttons, 
switches, displays, and controls must accurately and reliably represent information to the human 
operator, and these interfaces do not stop just at the airplane level. Software also encompasses 
regulations and operational parameters, and these regulations and external operations cannot be 
neglected during error analysis and prevention. The SHEL model is a good starting point for 
creating a new taxonomy for factors contributing to accidents or anomalies, as it can begin to 
account for pre-existing unsafe conditions, including mental states or organizational policies. 
A well-designed, stable system exists in a state of equilibrium (Edwards, 1988). Dynamic 
systems with changing interfaces present a challenge to designers and managers, as well as to the 
operators of the system themselves. A continuous review of the system is necessary, so that variables 
beyond the control of designers and operators are properly managed. 
Reason (1997) speculates that systems operate for long periods with inherent safety flaws 
present within them. These flaws are not revealed until an accident or incident occurs. Sträter (2005) 
claims that stakeholders may even know and tolerate these flaws because of the following two states: 
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Nothing happened so far in my system => it is safe 
My system is safe => nothing will happen in my system 
Statement (b) is a simple reversion of inference from (a); however, this state may not actually 
be achieved. The appropriate way to consider either of the above statements is: 
There are unsafe elements in my system 
Identifying and managing these elements, in most cases, prevents incidents and leads to 
increased safety and higher performance, as the system no longer has to recover from unsafe 
conditions. 
M o d e l i n g  a n d  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
Classification models assume that the cases investigated are heterogeneous. The classification 
model‘s end goal is to segregate as many cases into each defined category as they are observed. The 
model is effective when it correctly predicts assignments to given categories. The model fails if it 
describes the sample as completely homogeneous (e.g., each individual case comprises a category). 
Classification models are usually employed when identical treatment of all groups is not possible 
(Menard 1995). 
Selection models are concerned with accepting or rejecting cases from a given group or 
category. The cases are selected based on whether they fulfill a requirement or satisfy a criterion for 
inclusion in the group. Selection models may include a cutoff number for the amount of cases to be 
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included within a group. Such models are used when a certain number of cases must be chosen from 
a larger population (Wiggins 1973). 
Among the outputs of logistic regression is an odds ratio. The odds ratio is associated with a 
factor for an independent variable. If the odds ratio is greater than 1, the chance that the 
dichotomous dependent variable will be 1 increases when the associated independent variable 
increases (Menard, 1995). Put another way, an odds ratio greater than one means the presence or the 
increase of an independent variable increases the chance or odds that the dependent variable will be 
positive or present. Odds ratios are usually employed in epidemiological research when indicating 
whether the presence or severity of a factor increases the chances of a disease or disorder to be 
present. 
A study by Thoraval et al (1997) employed logistic regression to investigate factors 
contributing to the severity of Hepatitis C Virus (HCV)-related liver disease. Their findings 
calculated the odds ratios of various factors. Those that had ratios greater than 1 and had thus 
contributed to the presence of liver disease were over age 30, exhibited excessive alcohol intake, and 
had HBsAg, the surface antigen signaling the presence of the Hepatitis B Virus (HBV). The findings 
of this study caused the authors to mandate abstinence from alcohol intake for HCV-infected 
patients, as abstaining from alcohol halved the risk of disease progression to cirrhosis in these 
patients. 
Logistic regression models have been employed successfully to identify risk factors and their 
severity in bacterial colonization of chickens by Kapperud et al (1993). The authors examined flocks 
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of chickens at various farms for presence of campylobacter colonization at time of slaughter. Managers 
of the farms were interviewed regarding hygiene and husbandry practices for the chickens. Factors 
found to be associated with the presence of the bacterial colonization included providing the 
chickens with water that had not been disinfected, tending to other poultry prior to entering the 
chicken house under investigation, geographic region, and season. The study concluded that the 
most effective preventative measure against bacterial colonization was to disinfect water provided to 
the chickens. 
M a c h i n e  L e a r n i n g  
The discipline of machine learning concerns itself with a type of algorithm development that 
allows computers to behave in a desired, usually unsupervised fashion. A major goal of machine 
learning is to automatically recognize complex patterns and subsequently formulate appropriate 
actions, decisions, or behaviors given the nature of the data. Machine learning has ties to AI, as well 
as probability theory and data mining. The major obstacle to machine learning is that modern 
programming languages and data structures are still not complex or robust enough to accommodate 
all possible choices for behavior. Machine learning involves statistics and computer science, but 
there are two major problems those disciplines must solve: efficient algorithms are required to 
optimize training, and efficient storage is needed for findings and related data (Alpaydin, 2004). 
The field of AI has long struggled with developing an efficient means for machine learning. 
Vast amounts of data were fed to ―expert systems‖ in the 1960s in an effort to give machines all the 
data necessary for making good decisions and approximating human behavior. These systems failed. 
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Lormand (1990) described the difficulties AI faces in a paper on the frame problem. The frame 
problem describes the issue of ―teaching‖ a computer or artificial system to make relevant choices. 
The author outlines iterations of computer and robot designs, starting from C2, the causation 
computer, to R2D1, a robot-relevant "deducer." C2 is unable differentiate causality between 
different time states. That is, given the simple problem of asking the computer whether an object 
exists within a room before and after it is removed from the room, the computer is unable to 
determine the correct answer. For a human, this question is trivial. 
Skipping through design process iterations to R2D1 shows a machine that is able to 
determine the implications of its actions when given a goal to complete. However, R2D1 considers 
all the possibilities of its actions, and then tags them as relevant or not. The rather comical task 
given to R2D1 by Lormand is to escape a room with a bomb in it that is attached to a cart 
containing R2D1‘s power source. Poor R2D1 is still in the room deciding whether the colors of the 
walls will change if it decides to move when the bomb explodes. The fictional R2D2, the ideal for 
robot designers, one who can quickly and accurately deduce the effects of its actions and choose 
relevant actions given a problem, is the ultimate goal (Dennett, 1987). This problem, of using 
empirical data to determine appropriate actions, is the very essence of machine learning. 
There are various types of machine learning: 
1. Supervised learning – a function that maps inputs to outputs, akin to human 
learning, where a desired response given a specific input is required 
2. Unsupervised learning – a model that groups inputs, very similar to clustering 
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3. Semi-supervised learning – algorithms that operate on data that is both labeled and 
unlabeled that create and verify the learning algorithm at the same time 
4. Reinforcement learning – algorithms that operate on iterations where subsequent 
observations guide the algorithm through feedback mechanisms 
Machine learning has been applied to analyzing functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) data. Algorithms have been developed that create classifiers that can decode stimuli, 
behaviors, mental states, and otherwise extract information from complex data structures. Pereira et 
al (2008) created classifiers that were able to discriminate patterns, localize those patterns, and even 
characterize them. To do this, a classifier function that operated on various features (independent 
variables) of the example fMRI data was created to predict the class that the data belonged to 
(dependent variable). For this particular study, the features used were voxels, data elements that 
represent volume elements in three dimensional space. Voxels are analogous to their 2-dimensional 
pixels, which represent 2D image data. The voxel data were arranged in row vectors and fed to the 
algorithm, which classified that particular area of the fMRI dataset. Machine learning is known to 
operate best when data are in numerical, vector form. Using these classifiers allowed authors to 
produce meaningful information out of otherwise complex, high-dimensional data. 
S t r u c t u r a l  E q u a t i o n  M o d e l i n g  
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is a statistical method for determining and estimating 
causal relationships by employing statistical data and qualitative data based on given assumptions, 
such as survey data. SEM requires interval data that defines abstract constructs to be effective. The 
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method of SEM allows the creation of latent variables. These are not measured directly; rather they 
are estimated from the model by related, measured variables. A goodness of fit test is conducted, 
and model unreliability is thus measured. 
There are four core SEM techniques: 
1. Confirmatory factor analysis - used to assess loading of variables, and quantify the 
number of factors present 
2. Path analysis - describes dependencies among a set of variables 
3. Latent growth curves - a longitudinal analysis technique that estimates growth over 
time (commonly used in social sciences) 
4. Structural equation models - tests and estimates of causal relationships 
The field of social work employs structural equation modeling. A review of the use of SEM 
conducted by Guo, Perron, and Gillespie (2008) focused on SEM methods used in 32 social work 
studies published between 2001 and 2007. Critiques and suggestions for individual practices and 
methods resulted from this review. Findings supported the fact that SEM analysis generated models 
and measures not previously tested empirically. However, a very important trend was discovered in 
which studies employing SEM would meaningfully modify models without "theoretical justification or 
substantive interpretations" (Guo, Perron, and Gillespie, 2008). When modifying the model, the authors 
suggested doing so only when theoretical justification existed, and to employ appropriate estimation 
procedures when doing so. Studies were also investigated for best practices, including proper 
theoretical specification of the model, which is important as accuracies of parameter estimates 
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depend on both the soundness of the theory and the validity of the measurement. Study findings 
stressed that poor SEM practices compromise the field's knowledge base. 
S e l f - o r g a n i z i n g  m a p s  
Connectionist neural networks developed in the 1980s were thought to most mimic and 
resemble human learning in machines. These networks consist of varying layers of nodes, and, by 
altering the weights between the nodes, a given input pattern can be "taught" to match an output 
pattern. These networks work in parallel, through a process called spreading activation. Once the 
weights are sufficiently altered in the layers of the network, any input can be matched to any output, 
despite the presence of aberrations, inconsistencies, or even missing data. 
Self-organizing maps (SOM) are a subset of artificial neural networks that create two-
dimensional surfaces based on training samples. This property is useful to visualize high dimensional 
data, and large SOMs can even display emergent data (Kohonen and Honkela, 2007). This is because 
these SOMs are model-free – they do not have an imposed training program – and because of this 
property, previously undiscoverable patterns can be found, given the lack of introduced investigation 
bias. 
SOM Tools 
Self-organizing maps visualize high-dimensional data in a low dimensional grid (Kohonen, 
1998). Stated another way, the SOM process converts complex, nonlinear statistical relationships 
into simple geometrical relationships. The SOM compresses information, but keeps metric and 
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topological relationships between data points intact. Beyond this already-useful property, the SOM 
can be "taught" to produce abstractions. These abstractions, like in the SEM approach, may reveal 
previously unknown or unimagined relationships between data elements. Kohonen (1998) describes 
the following properties of SOM: 
1. It consists of a two dimensional grid of nodes, each of which is associated with a 
model of a given observation 
2. It employs an algorithm that optimizes the description of a domain of discrete or 
continuously distributed observations. 
3. Models are formed and organized so that similar models are closer to each other in 
the grid than the differing ones, offering both the benefits of a similarity graph and a 
clustering diagram. 
The SOM has already seen applied use in a variety of domains. They have been used in data-
mining applications, creating similarity graphs for statistical tables and full-text document collections 
(Kohonen, 1998). 
D i m e n s i o n a l i t y  R e d u c t i o n  
Dimensionality reduction is a topic that has received recent attention. There is a staggering 
amount of data being created every day. Accessing, categorizing, and using this information requires 
organization. To handle ―real-world,‖ often unstructured, high-dimensional data accurately and with 
minimal computational load is a challenge for mathematicians and computer scientists alike. In a 
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review by van der Maaten et al (2009) efficient data representations should have a dimensionality 
level that approaches the intrinsic dimensionality of the original data. Fukunaga (1990) defines 
intrinsic dimensionality as the minimum number of parameters necessary to represent the functional 
properties of the data. The below figure displays a taxonomy of dimensionality reduction techniques 
reproduced from van der Maaten (2009). 
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Figure 7: Taxonomy of dimensionality reduction techniques (van der Maaten, 2009) 
D i f f u s i o n  M a p s  
Diffusion maps are one of many techniques for dimensionality reduction. When dealing with 
multiple categories of data or many factors, visualizing the data to deduce meaning can be 
challenging or impossible. Dimensionality reduction assumes that the data observed has some sort 
of structure or logical order to it, and therefore could be reduced to a dimensional level low enough 
to be represented or visualized. For this to occur it is assumed that the interesting data can be 
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represented on a non-linear manifold, or mathematical space. A manifold is an abstract 
mathematical concept where points exist in a domain that resembles Euclidean space. Manifolds of a 
sufficiently low dimensional level can be plotted or otherwise represented visually. Dimensionality 
reduction techniques have been successfully employed in machine learning, mapping, and clustering 
activities. When reducing dimensionality the goal is to maintain any underlying structures or patterns 
in the high-dimensional data. 
Diffusion maps work by embedding high dimensional data onto low dimension Euclidean 
space. This is done through the eigenvectors of defined random walks performed on the data. The 
data is assumed to be randomly sampled from an underlying general probability distribution: 
 (x)     (x) 
(1) 
As the number of samples approaches infinity, eigenvectors of each diffusion map converge 
to the eigenfunctions of a corresponding differential operator defined on the support of the 
probability distribution (Nadler et al, 2006). Diffusion maps have the added benefit that, when 
properly employed, they quickly converge on a meaningful scheme or result. In most applications 
diffusion maps are unsupervised when employed. Coifman et al (2005) present a general framework 
for diffusion maps, and demonstrate diffusion maps‘ effectiveness in exploring geometry, statistics, 
and functions of data. The authors also demonstrate how diffusion maps afford a low-dimensional 
embedding of high-dimensional data. This process is naturally suited for visualization, clustering, 
and regression. 
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The diffusion map algorithm process as described by Bah (2008) employs four major steps, 
summarized below. It assumes the data has already been modeled by a weighted graph. 
1. An adjacency matrix of the graph is created 
2. A diagonal k × k normalization matrix and Laplacian matrix of the graph are 
calculated 
3. Eigenvalues and eigenvectors are computed of these two matrices 
4. The lowest value initial eigenvector is dropped, and the next m eigenvectors are used 
to represent the n-dimensional space. 
One fascinating aspect pointed out by Bah (2008) is that diffusion maps may mirror 
biological functions. For example, the human brain is constantly bombarded by unstructured, highly 
dimensional stimuli. Diffusion maps may model the biological analogs that perform natural 
clustering and categorizing applications to make sense of surroundings. 
Lafon and Lee (2006) describe a unified framework for employing diffusion maps to reduce 
dimensionality and cluster documents according to the words contained within them. Use of k-
means clustering in diffusion space allows this categorization, and the authors also propose a 
measure of clustering accuracy used to assess the results given by the algorithm. 
Dimensionality reduction has found recent use in extracting information from a corpus of 
text documents. Underhill (2007) states that manipulating large amounts of text data can be 
extremely computationally intensive. A reduced dataset with relevant meanings intact would be 
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extremely useful in information extraction efforts. In addition, such information extraction could be 
unsupervised and automated, providing a way to manage the incredible amounts of information 
being generated. 
D a t a  m i n i n g  a n d  t e x t  m i n i n g  
Data mining is a technique used to extract patterns and trends from data stores. Many 
agencies and individuals employ data mining techniques: these agencies range from surveillance and 
law enforcement applications, to nuclear power plant operations, to aircraft maintenance. These 
patterns and trends can be employed in both proactive and reactive methods. Data mining, at its 
most basic level, serves to match input data to an output cause, through a logical and appropriate 
mapping function (Kantardzie, 2003). 
For example, data on aircraft component reliability can be used to form maintenance 
intervals by calculating mean time between failure (MTBF) of individual elements, thus justifying 
extending maintenance on long-lasting components, or implement more frequent inspections on 
items that fail often or unexpectedly. These trends and insights are only as good as the quality of the 
data used; inaccurate, falsified, or missing data points may lead to unusable or incorrect conclusions. 
Data mining employs a given "sample" of a larger whole of data. One possible shortcoming 
of this process is that the sample may not contain a property or trend that exists in the population. 
Likewise, a pattern discovered in the sample may not be present in the population: statistical 
validation and verification of results must be properly carried out in relation to patterns found in 
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other samples. 
Humans naturally form patterns and draw conclusions from their sensory inputs, ranging 
from observations on trends in weather patterns to the behavior of the opposite sex. It wasn't until 
modern times (around the 1600-1700s) that more formal, procedural methods were required for the 
ever-increasing amount of data being created. Early, formal data mining procedures include Bayes' 
Theorem and Regression analysis (Kantardzie, 2003). 
Data mining employs assumptions paired with the division of data to identify trends. Such 
trends may provide new insights that are not easily discernible from simple averages, means, and 
other descriptive statistics. Frequency counts and percentages are two frequently employed methods. 
The method employed in this study will be based on the Cross Industry Standard Process 
for Data Mining (CRISP-DM), developed and partially funded by the European Commission under 
the ESPRIT program. 
There are four levels of the data mining process model. These are: phases, generic tasks, 
specialized tasks, and process instances. The phases organize the lower operations. Generic tasks 
attempt to cover all data mining necessities, and should be as complete and mature as possible. This 
means that generic tasks can serve a variety of data mining applications and remain valid, despite the 
use of novel modeling techniques. The specialized task level further develops generic task steps into 
operations. They may, for example, clean, reorganize, or reclassify data. The final process instance 
level is a detailed account of actions and results of the data mining activity. It will detail what actually 
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occurred rather than provide an overview. 
Four Level Breakdown of the CRISP-DM Methodology
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Figure 8: CRISP-DM method for data mining 
The CRISP-DM method breaks the data mining process down into six steps, starting with 
developing a business understanding and culminating with deployment of the findings. 
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Figure 9: Overview of iterative CRISP-DM method 
The six steps are not strictly defined, and the process is iterative at any of the steps. 
Outcomes of one step determine which step will follow. The entire process is cyclical in nature. The 
investigator determines which path to take or whether to proceed based on results of the prior 
operation. The six steps are outlined below: 
1. Business understanding - the objectives and requirements of the mining project are 
translated from business perspectives to an achievable problem definition and 
preliminary plan 
2. Data understanding - this step entails activities with collection and initial 
familiarization activities with the data; this is where quality problems are addressed 
and underlying hypotheses are formed 
3. Data preparation - the final dataset is constructed and arranged in a way that the 
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modeling tool may appropriately process it 
4. Modeling - appropriate modeling techniques are performed, often necessitating 
adjustment and validation activities; it is likely that a return to the preparation phase 
may occur as anomalies are discovered 
5. Evaluation - a high quality model is verified to ensure its operational usefulness; a 
decision is made regarding the final use of the results, as well as suitability from a 
business perspective  
6. Deployment - this phase varies depending on the model's intended use, it can range 
from report generation to implementation of the process enterprise-wide; the step 
focuses mainly on presenting the results in a useful fashion 
Mining and visualizing data has become very important, as the sheer amount of data being 
generated in the 21st century limits its usability to draw inferences. It is estimated that every year 1 
exabyte of data, mostly digital in nature, is generated by human society. This trend means that, 
during a study period between 2002 and 2005, more data was generated than had been in all of prior 
human history (Keim, 2002). Automated machine data mining techniques may not always properly 
make relevant associations. Keim (2002) describes the usefulness of visual methods, which integrate 
the human (who has a large associative memory and is able to make relevancy decisions and 
recognize patterns) into the data mining and exploration process. Departures from automated 
mining techniques include the ability to deal with noisy and nonhomogeneous data, as well as being 
intuitive and not requiring in-depth understanding of advanced mathematics or statistics. Visual 
exploration is faster and provides better results in situations where automatic data mining algorithms 
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fail. 
Data mining has been employed successfully by Yang & Chou (2003) in an effort to assign 
biological functions to genes, proteins, and compounds. Varying data mining methods were utilized, 
including decision tree and self-organizing map procedures. The decision tree method involved 
extracting some rules for matching gene characteristics to gene expression, and employing them for 
decision making. However, this method, heavily reliant on frequency estimation, did not take into 
account interactions between certain biological constructs. The lack of interaction information 
reduced the predictive ability of the decision tree method. It was concluded that the predictive rules 
derived from the SOM method were much more robust than the decision tree method. The SOM 
rules were also shown to be more accurate than the decision tree rules, and much less sensitive to 
noise. 
L i t e r a t u r e  B a s e d  D i s c o v e r y  ( L B D )  
Text mining uncovers information from otherwise unorganized document sources. Modern 
computers can store unprecedented amounts of data due to their vast processing and storage 
capabilities. However, this information is irrelevant and useless without a means to extract 
meaningful information and relationships. Human beings are excellent at discovering meanings and 
patterns, but lack the processing capabilities of computers to investigate large volumes of text. 
Computers, on the other hand, do not have advanced associative capabilities. 
Underhill (2007) describes a serendipitous incident where a medical researcher uncovered a 
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novel treatment for a disease. The researcher, Swanson (1986) was investigating Reynaud‘s disease. 
Swanson searched the Medline database for symptoms associated with Reynaud‘s disease, which 
were high blood viscosity and platelet aggregation. A second search on just the symptoms revealed 
that fish oil treats said symptoms. As a result, Swanson reasoned that fish oil can help manage 
Reynaud‘s disease and, after some research and clinical trials, this idea was found to be true. This 
novel thinking and mining of the medical database extracted novel information and created a new 
association. It is currently extremely difficult for computers to perform such an operation because 
most text records are represented in unstructured natural language. 
C l u s t e r i n g  
Clustering is a method of classification: it divides data into logical subsets. The subsets are 
defined by similarity, and this similarity is defined by some measure of distance between items 
(Gibson et al, 1998). Clustering is employed in machine learning, pattern recognition, trend analysis, 
and text mining. It simply groups similar items in a given dataset. Clustering works ideally with 
numerical data, as Euclidian distance between items is easily calculated. It is far more challenging to 
cluster categorical or nominal data, as relations can be completely arbitrary, subjective, or otherwise 
difficult to quantify. 
Gibson et al (1998) developed an approach for clustering set data. The names of items, data 
not numerical in nature, cannot be ordered naturally by a systematic method. The approach assigned 
and propagated weights ascribed to the categorical values in a table, thus creating a similarity 
measure. The results were presented as non-linear dynamical systems, thereby creating a connection 
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between tables of categorical data and said systems. The developed system was effective at 
uncovering similarities and sub-populations in various types of data. As exhibited by most diffusion 
maps, Gibson‘s systems quickly converged and did not require large computational effort. 
A popular algorithm for clustering is the k-means method. The algorithm was first 
introduced by Cox (1957). It was later popularized for partitioning large numerical data sets with by 
MacQueen (1967). The k-means method is employed in the fields of statistics and machine learning. 
The goal of the algorithm is to partition n observations into k clusters. The clusters are based on 
means. To successfully implement the algorithm, k must be specified. Using too large or too small a 
k value will yield undesirable results. 
K-means operates by calculating Euclidean distance between observations. To compute a 
measure of clustering breadth or scatter, variance of the observations is employed. Algorithms that 
cluster data into partitions utilize a cost function of the type 
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(2) 
In the above equation, n is the number of elements in the data set, di is the data object, Cj is 
the center of the jth cluster, and q is an integer defining the nature of the distance function (for 
example, 2 is used for Euclidean distance). K-means simplicity also has its drawbacks, as a correct k 
must be specified and traditional, unmodified k-means clustering only operates on numerical data 
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(Hartigan, 1979). Categorical variables do not work well as there is no natural ordering among the 
values of each category. 
Huang (1997) altered the k-means algorithm to allow clustering of categorical values without 
sacrificing the algorithm‘s efficiency. A new algorithm was introduced, k-prototypes, which seeks to 
maximize intra cluster similarity of observations entered into it. 
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(3) 
The quantity to the right of the summation operator represents the distance of a data object 
from the closest cluster center. A dissimilarity measure for categorical objects is employed, and 
modes are used instead of means for clusters. A frequency-based process updates the modes that 
minimize the cost function. The algorithm comprises three processes: selection, allocation, and re-
allocation. The algorithm concludes its iterative process once a local optimum is reached. A typical 
application to a large data set containing 75,808 records and 20 attributes resulted in 64 similar 
clusters. 
Ahmad and Dey (2007) proposed a new k-mean clustering algorithm that works for mixed 
numeric and categorical data. A new cost function and distance measure based on co-occurrence of 
values was proposed. In addition, the proposed algorithm accounted for significance of an attribute 
towards the clustering operation. Finally, the authors presented a modified definition of a cluster 
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center that no longer required numerical data to characterize the cluster. The new representation of 
the cluster center demonstrated that it captured cluster characteristics well as contained the 
distribution of all categorical values in a given cluster. The resulting algorithm was tested with 
positive results across various real world datasets, ranging from political voting choices by party, to 
heart disease data, to credit card usage in Australia. 
San, Huynh, and Nakamori (2004) introduced an extension to the k-means algorithm that 
employed a concept called ―cluster centers‖ for dealing with categorical data without sacrificing 
efficiency. The authors noted that Huang‘s (1997) algorithm, which replaces means with modes to 
determine clusters, can become unstable due to the non-unique nature of the modes. Selection of 
the modes strongly influences the results of the clustering process. By using their ―cluster centers‖ 
notion, San et al (2004) used fuzziness rather than means to determine clusters. By no longer relying 
on mode selection and allowing fuzzy clustering to organize the data, the authors found about a 69 
percent chance of obtaining a good clustering result across two experiments. A ―good result‖ was 
defined by a clustering accuracy of r > 0.87. The measure of clustering accuracy r was proposed by 
Huang (1998) and defined as: 
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In the above equation, al is defined as the number of data objects that occur in both a cluster 
and its labeling class, while n is the number of objects in the data set. Research demonstrates that it 
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is possible to cluster and systematically organize categorical data, assuming there is an underlying 
pattern to the data. 
Document Clustering 
Text mining is a subset of data mining, with similar goals in mind. It is applied to large 
volumes of non-structured text files as opposed to numerical or interval data. It is used to discover 
knowledge from text data (Renz and Franke, 2003). There are two types of operations that text 
mining performs: 
1. Categorization - assigning a given class to a text 
2. Clustering - splitting a text collection into topics 
Text mining as a discipline arose due to the complexity of human language and 
accompanying human desire to organize, store, and retrieve relevant information from text sources. 
Language serves the vital role of communication, but it is not easily analyzed by computers (Rend 
and Franke, 2003). This is due to the many functions language performs, from description to 
instruction to conveying of emotions. Language is associative and contains many contexts, which 
can change rapidly and drastically over the course of a conversation or narrative report. Deducing 
relevant facts and creating knowledge from these text reports is one goal of text mining. Clustering 
has been shown to aid information retrieval and summarization, as it facilitates locating relevant 
material much more quickly. 
As stated previously, the sheer number of documents and information being produced poses 
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a serious challenge for organization activities. Natural language has a high dimensionality value. 
Allah, Grosky, and Aboutajdine (2008) proposed a document clustering method based on diffusion 
maps and k-means clustering. Based on the underlying assumption that related documents – those 
documents belonging to the same cluster – are likely to share a common trait defined by a distance 
measure, the authors stated that the similarity distance measure used was more interesting than the 
representation space. Their process employed diffusion maps and singular value decomposition 
(SVD) to cluster documents. The main finding was that, if documents are properly defined by 
accurate and reliable distance measures, diffusion maps are highly effective, as well as 
computationally efficient, in clustering them. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 
A review of the literature demonstrates that errors can be classified and appropriate counters 
implemented, thereby managing error. It further shows that errors are not random, and have 
associative properties when considered in environmental and situational contexts. It stands to reason 
that if certain error types exist, and these types can be linked to conditional factors, then a survey of 
anomalies can reveal insights or imply causal information through correlation, association, and 
regression analysis. These findings can lead to guidelines for error management and prevention 
through the investigation of said trends. Furthermore, clustering and grouping of the data can reveal 
additional insights on incident and factor relationships. A review of the literature thus demonstrates 
that human error is manageable, thereby implying relationship, predictability, and structure to the 
patterns of human error. 
The method of investigation from the Hobbs & Williamson (2003) study forms the basis of 
investigation for the present study. The ASRS database identified factors that were reported along 
with each anomaly. These anomalies were also broken down into types. A categorical breakdown of 
these anomalies and their associated factors was first conducted. 
D a t a  S t r u c t u r e s  
Data was provided via an ASCII text dump of the Oracle database employed by ASRS. 
These data were extracted, merged, and categorized by type. All available data as of March 15, 2010 
was used. The ASRS database classifies anomalies based on the following types and subsets: 
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Table 4: ASRS Anomalies and their subsets 
ASRS Anomaly Types and Subsets 
Aircraft Equipment 
Critical 
Less Severe 
Airspace Violations 
ATC Issues 
Flight Deck/Cabin/Aircraft Event 
Illness 
Passenger Electronic Device 
Passenger Misconduct 
Smoke/Fire/Fumes/Odor 
Conflict 
NMAC 
Airborne Conflict 
Ground Conflict 
Critical 
Less Severe 
Deviation - Altitude 
Deviation - Speed 
Deviation - Track/Heading Deviation - Procedural 
Clearance 
FAR 
Hazardous Material Violation 
Landing without Clearance 
Maintenance 
MEL (Minimum Equipment List) 
Published Material/Policy 
Security 
Weight and Balance 
Ground Excursion 
Ramp 
Runway 
Taxiway 
Ground Incursion 
Runway 
Taxiway 
Ground Event/Encounter 
Aircraft 
FOD 
Gear Up Landing 
Ground Strike - Aircraft 
Loss of Aircraft Control 
Object 
Person/Animal/Bird 
Vehicle 
In-flight Event/Encounter 
CFTT/CFIT 
Fuel Issue 
Loss of Aircraft Control 
Object 
Bird/Animal 
Unstabilized Approach 
VFR in IMC (flight into low-visibility 
conditions without proper authorization) 
Wake Vortex Encounter 
Weather/Turbulence 
No Specific Anomaly Occurred 
Other 
D a t a  U n d e r s t a n d i n g  
The data for this study arrived in three ASCII text files. The three files contained strings of 
column data separated by pipe (|) characters. The first file examined was the ALL_ITEMS.txt data 
file. It was converted to SPSS .sav format using the SPSS data input wizard via the GETTEXT 
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command. The data organized into 5 columns. The columns comprised an ID field, a descriptive 
ENTITY field, an ATTRIBUTE field and two VALUE fields, a general value and a DISPLAY value 
field. 
 
Figure 10: Data fields from the ALL_ITEMS file 
The ENUMERATOR and DISPLAY_VALUE columns were not utilized in this study, as 
they were not populated with usable data. The ENUMERATOR field was populated with 1s, while 
the display value field was only populated when a measurement or instrument reading was associated 
with the record. The ENTITY field marked relevant records for extraction. The records employed 
in this study were those marked Anomaly.[Type], Assessments, Person, and Result.[Type] where 
[Type] indicated a subset element. 
The second file of interest was the TEXT.txt file. As with the ALL_ITEMS.txt file, the data 
was encoded in ASCII text. Each record had an ID field, an ENTITY field, an ENUMERATOR, 
ATTRIBUTE, and TEXT field. The ENTITY and ENUMERATOR fields were not used, and 
relevant records were extracted using the ATTRIBUTE field, with only records marked ―Narrative‖ 
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being employed for the text mining part of the study. 
 
Figure 11: Fields from the TEXT.txt file 
The nature of the ASRS database was found to be a list of records. Individual reports 
contained a unique identifier code, found in the ITEM_ID column. This number marked all 
elements associated with that record. Each record identifier contained multiple rows of data. To 
proceed, the relevant rows of data had to be separated from the master ALL_ITEMS file, and then 
recombined in a new file to create additional columns, ensuring that the ITEM_ID field is used as a 
key to maintain integrity of the record. In this way, a new file could be created that contains all 
columns deemed necessary for the analysis. The PASW Modeler 13 tool was used for this part of the 
process. 
The ASRS database contained a data field named "Assessments," where contributing factors 
or situations to the anomaly were identified. The assessments field further identified elements as 
"Contributing Factors / Situations," with a special emphasis on one item if it was identified as a 
"Primary Problem." The items that were entered into Contributing Factors / Situations or Primary 
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Problem were identical save for an additional option for the Primary Problem category, called 
Ambiguous. 
Table 5: ASRS Contributing factors entry types 
ASRS Contributing Factors / Situations and Primary Problem Classifications 
Aircraft Human Factors 
Airport Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part 
Airspace Structure Logbook Entry 
ATC Equip / Nav Facility / Buildings Manuals 
Chart or Publication MEL 
Company Policy Procedure 
Equipment / Tooling Staffing 
Environment - Non Weather Related Weather 
 Ambiguous 
 
D a t a  P r e p a r a t i o n  
The text files were translated into two large SPSS .sav documents. These files were then 
transferred to the PASW Modeler 13 application for further manipulation operations. The creation 
of the analysis files required a multiple step process. The following operations were employed to 
create a combined analysis file with text data: 
1. Extraction of all records with an ―Anomaly.*‖ ATTRIBUTE value 
2. Extraction of all records with an ―Assessment‖ ENTITY value 
3. Extraction of all records with an ENTITY value of ―Person,‖ and an ATTRIBUTE 
value of ―Human Factors‖ for a separate analysis 
4. Extraction of text records whose ATTRIBUTE value matches ―Narrative‖ 
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5. Merging of ―Anomaly,‖ ―Assessment,‖ and ―Narrative‖ files 
6. Elimination of duplicate entries by assuring that only unique ITEM_ID fields exist 
(no duplicate ITEM_ID fields) 
 
Figure 12: Data merging process (PASW Modeler 13) 
After selecting and extracting each type of relevant record (Anomaly, Assessment, Result), 
the new data element was created as a new column in an output file. This process created duplicate 
entries during the merging process, as numbers of records in each file were not consistent. One file 
or the other would contribute more records, thus creating unnecessary duplicate row entries. These 
duplicates were eliminated by assuring that only one unique ITEM_ID existed per record. This 
eliminated duplicate narrative text fields, which, if left in the file, would drastically increase file sizes 
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and computation times. The completed, pared down data file was now ready for analysis; it 
contained entries for anomalies, factors (assessments), and text data detailing the account in 
narrative form. 
The other files containing results and human factors field data were set aside for a separate 
analysis. Not all records input into the analysis software contained these fields, as they were later 
added to the ASRS data collection process. For example, Human Factors data was not specifically 
encoded by the system until June of 2009 (Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2002). 
D a t a  M i n i n g  
The study employed data mining steps consistent with the CRISP-DM method. The six 
steps as they pertain to this activity are outlined below: 
1. The business case for this activity was to identify what factors are present when 
pilots submit these anomaly reports. Anomalies were considered for this activity 
rather than accidents as accidents are rare when contrasted with these reports. 
Meaningful patterns can be discovered from these reports, rather than rare and non-
routine accidents. 
2. The ASCII data dump was analyzed and understood. It was decided that the "other" 
anomaly type did not contribute any useful information, and increased the overall 
variability and noise in the dataset. This category was discarded for analysis. The type 
"No Specific Anomaly Occurred" was kept as a report containing admission of 
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violation of procedure or other difficulty without incident, which could still 
contribute meaningful information. 
3. Data was prepared through appropriate merging, discarding, and type classification 
activities. The data arrived in separate ASCII text files; these data had to be merged 
and organized. Report numbers identified individual report elements in rows. 
Anomalies were divided into their classification, then grouped by details. Factors 
were also grouped into sets, and these sets were divided into primary cause and 
secondary or contributing factors. The details of each anomaly were also grouped, 
and the text reports were kept organized by report number. 
4. The modeling techniques performed included self-organizing maps, clustering 
analysis, and dimensionality reduction using diffusion maps. 
5. The evaluation phase - Models were evaluated using goodness of fit analysis, tools 
internal to PASW Modeler 13, and clustering accuracy measures as proposed in 
Huang (1998). 
6. Deployment phase – results were presented in graphical and tabular form displaying 
what factors were associated with civil aircraft anomaly reporting. 
S t r u c t u r a l  E q u a t i o n  M o d e l i n g  
The methods of structural equation modeling described in the literature could not be 
employed due to the categorical nature of the data. Many accident reports contain qualitative 
elements such as "bad weather," or "high workload conditions." These are represented as categories, 
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and are either present or not. For SEM to be effective, interval data is required. 
L o g i s t i c  R e g r e s s i o n  
The data were entered into a multimodal logistic regression model to determine which pre-
classified factors contributed most to selected anomaly types. The most prevalent frequencies of 
anomalies were used for this exercise. Anomalies associated with less than three percent of the data 
were not used in the analysis. SPSS release 17 was used for the analysis. Specifically, the multinomial 
logistic regression command employing the NOMREG algorithm calculated the results. This 
algorithm models illustrate the dependence of a nominal categorical response on a set of discrete 
predictor variables. 
Logistic regression is a statistical method for predicting the probability of the occurrence of 
an event based on predictor variables (Hosmer, 2000). Logistic regression differs from traditional 
regression in that it can employ categorical as well as numerical data. Because of these qualities, it 
has found use in applications which rely on categorical values or dichotomous variables. The 
strength of the logistic function underlying logistic regression is that it can handle input values of 
any magnitude, while outputting values between 0 and 1. The logistic function is defined in the 
below equation, demonstrating how any input z will take the form of a range between 0 and 1. This 
attribute allows the equation to force outputs to be between 0 and 1.  
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(5) 
Logistic regression can be used to create models suited for prediction, classification, and 
selection. Prediction models group cases according to whether they satisfy a given criterion. There 
are no constraints on the sizes of these groups; all cases may be predicted to be ―positive‖ or 
―negative.‖ This means it is possible for all cases to be predicted to belong to one group, i.e., the 
sample or population is homogenous. Predictive logistic regression is usually applied to those 
situations where identical treatment, based on the findings of all groups, is a possibility (Menard 
1995). 
Multinomial Logistic regression builds upon basic logistic models. When a dependent 
variable has M categories one value is designated as the reference category. The other categories are 
compared to reference category in terms of probability. For two categories the equation is: 
  
 (    )
 (    )
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(6) 
When there are more than 2 groups the probability calculation becomes slightly more 
complicated as the P(Yi) term must be solved: 
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(7) 
The output is a probability of belonging to a given category. These probabilities are 
compared to the reference category chosen for the logistic regression analysis, and assignments are 
based on the comparisons of these probability calculations. These methods are described in more 
detail in Borooah (2001). 
C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  A n a l y s i s  
The statistical software package SPSS r17 was used to perform the dimensionality reduction 
process in the form of correspondence analysis. Data were coded in alphabetical order. These coded 
data were then analyzed using the CORRESPONDENCE command within SPSS to generate plots 
and cross tabulations. 
Correspondence analysis operates optimally on categorical data, and is applied to data that is 
nonnegative and on the same scale. The data used in this study was categorical data coded into single 
digit numerals. The method operates similarly on rows and columns, and operates on contingency 
tables. Correspondence analysis decomposes the chi-square statistic based on this table into 
orthogonal factors. Correspondence analysis is a descriptive technique so it can be used whether it is 
correct to apply the chi-square statistic or not.  
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Table 6: Coding scheme for anomaly types 
Old Value New Value Value Label 
   
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment 
Problem 1 
Anomaly.Aircraft 
Equipment Problem 
Anomaly.ATC Issue 2 Anomaly.ATC Issue 
Anomaly.Conflict 3 Anomaly.Conflict 
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude 4 
Anomaly.Deviation - 
Altitude 
Anomaly.Deviation - 
Procedural 5 
Anomaly.Deviation - 
Procedural 
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / 6 
Anomaly.Deviation - 
Track / Heading 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / 
Encounter 7 
Anomaly.Inflight 
Event / Encounter 
 
Table 7: Coding scheme for factor types 
Old Value New Value Value Label 
   
Aircraft 1 Aircraft 
Airport 2 Airport 
Airspace Structure 3 Airspace Structure 
Ambiguous 4 Ambiguous 
ATC Equipment / Nav Facil 5 ATC Equipment / Nav Facil 
Chart Or Publication 6 Chart Or Publication 
Company Policy 7 Company Policy 
Environment - Non Weather 8 Environment - Non Weather 
Equipment / Tooling 9 Equipment / Tooling 
Human Factors 10 Human Factors 
Incorrect / Not Installed 11 Incorrect / Not Installed 
Logbook Entry 12 Logbook Entry 
Manuals 13 Manuals 
MEL 14 MEL 
Procedure 15 Procedure 
Staffing 16 Staffing 
Weather 17 Weather 
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T e x t  M i n i n g  
Various tools were considered for the text mining part of the study. Many tools exist that 
create contextual links between words in a text source. Khalid et al (2010) employed Leximancer 
(LXM) and Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). Leximancer is an online tool to which users can upload 
sets of documents for analysis. Both tools allow word counts to be performed, and identify concepts 
which can later be analyzed using statistical methods. 
Due to its aviation roots and administrative desire for standardization and efficiency, ASRS 
data is encoded. For example, concepts such as ―Air Carrier‖ or ―Go Around‖ were encoded into 
―ACR‖ and ―GAR.‖ Currently available text mining tools do not have dictionaries capable of 
interpreting these terms. In addition, a ―find/replace‖ operation was deemed infeasible due to the 
large number of records and the fact that there were over 700 terms to decode. Although the 
majority of encoded terms were abbreviations of aircraft components and aviation procedures, 
commonly used words such as ―aircraft,‖ ―runway,‖ and ―landing‖ were also encoded. Because of 
these encodings, traditional automated semantic analysis and text meaning tagging operations were 
not possible using standard tools. 
PASW Modeler 13 was chosen because it allows the user to create custom concepts and 
rules that do not rely on predefined dictionaries. It was therefore possible to extract concepts, 
though they had to be systematically defined and interpreted by a human analyst. Due to the nature 
of the data, complex text-linking and automated content-bearing extraction using existing text 
mining tools was not possible. 
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Figure 13: Selected ASRS encoded terms and their meanings 
To begin the text mining portion of the study, the completed data file was input into PASW 
Modeler‘s Text Analytics interface. This software tool analyzes all available text in the data and 
displays the most often encountered words. These often-encountered words were deemed 
―concepts.‖ These concepts were filtered and grouped by type. For example, words such as ―hyd‖ or 
―flt cntrls‖ were put into an ―aircraft components‖ type. These types were used to identify and 
create rules for classifying text entries; the container element that contained these rules and types 
was called a ―category.‖ 
Once types for selected popular concepts were defined, these types were used to build rules 
to automate record classification. These rules used logical operators on concepts to create 
relationships that selected and classified certain records. For example, records that contain concepts 
such as ―hyd failure‖ or ―smoke‖ or ―burning smell‖ likely indicate aircraft issues or malfunctions. 
The selection and classification rules were created using keywords and data from the HFACS 
classification system (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), Boeing MEDA tool (Rankin & Allen, 1996), and 
general pilot knowledge keywords elicited from a flight training text (Willits et al, 2004).  
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Table 8: Categories, rules, and their associated types and descriptors 
Categories Rules 
 Descriptors Type 
Aircraft Issues vibration 
 low oil pressure 
light 
 leak 
 hyd failure |  inspection |  disconnect |  valve |  
fire bottle |  volts 
 acft &  failure  
Unknown 
Rule 
Unknown 
Rule 
 
Rule 
Rule 
Knowledge-Based 
Errors 
<Knowledge-Based> Knowledge-Based 
Perceptual Errors spatial disorientation |  illusion |  visual perception 
 not heard 
 misjudge & ( distance |  flare |  altitude |  visual |  
aural) 
 disoriented  
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
 
Rule 
Rule-Based Errors wrong response |  prefight |  low fuel 
retrospect 
 exceeded ability 
<Rule-Based> 
( misdiagnose |  wrong |  inappropriate |  bad) & ( 
emergency |  maneuver |  decision) 
( bad |  wrong) & ( planning |  pre-flight |  fuel 
management |  decision |  go-around |  go 
around) 
Rule 
Unknown 
Rule 
Rule-Based 
 
Rule 
 
 
Rule 
Skill-Based Errors stalled |  spin 
 overcompensate |  overspeed |  wrong direction 
 inadvertently 
 forgot |  pressed wrong |  pushed wrong 
 did not notice |  didn't notice 
[ bad & ( technique |  control |  visual scan |  
conditions)] 
<Skill-Based> 
( omitted & ( step |  checklist)) 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
 
Rule 
Skill-Based 
Rule 
Unsafe Conditions wake turb 
 unsafe 
 tcasii &  ra 
 self medicating 
 reaction time |  visual limitation 
 not ready 
Unknown 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
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 misinterpreted |  misinterpretation 
 incapable |  inaptitude |  insufficient aptitude 
 illness |  incapacitated |  fatigue |  fatigued 
 excessive & ( physical |  training) 
 distr 
conflict 
 attention |  complacency |  distraction |  
distracted |  bad motivation |  overworked |  
situational awareness |  mental fatigue |  get home 
<Non-Routine Behaviors> 
( violation |  violated) & ( crew rest |  rest |  sleep 
|  bottle |  throttle) 
( failed |  did not |  didn't) & ( back up |  
communicate |  brief |  briefing |  resources |  
leadership) 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Unknown 
 
 
Rule 
Non-Routine Behaviors 
 
Rule 
 
 
Rule 
Unsafe Supervision without clrnc 
 unqualified 
 oversight 
 no training 
 no clrnc 
 known problem 
 hurrying 
 failed to enforce |  unqualified |  unauthorized 
 authorized hazard 
( supervisor |  boss |  chief) & ( violation)  
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Rule 
Violations VFR into IMC |  not current |  not qualified |  low 
altitude flight |  unauthorized |  hazardous 
maneuver |  aggressive maneuver 
 follow & ( procedure |  directive |  instruction |  
command |  briefing) 
 exceeded &  limits 
 canyon |  low altitude |  overspeed 
<Violation> 
Rule 
 
Rule 
 
Rule 
 
Rule 
Violation 
Weather twilight 
haze 
<Weather> 
Rule 
Unknown 
Weather 
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Figure 14: Selected types created from concepts 
The above figure shows a selection of types created from concepts. Commonly occurring 
concepts were grouped into types to facilitate category creation. These types were organized into 
libraries which were stored and reusable across analyses. A full list of the concepts and types used is 
presented in the Appendix B. 
C l u s t e r i n g  a n d  p r e d i c t i v e  m o d e l  g e n e r a t i o n  f r o m  t e x t  
m i n i n g  r e s u l t s  
After text extraction and subsequent categorization based on results from the literature 
review, predictive models were generated using PASW Modeler 13. The text analytics element of 
PASW Modeler 13 ―scored‘ each text record according to categories created. These categories 
became selector variables, employing a true or false flag to indicate whether an individual record 
contained elements of that category. These flags could now act as additional data points that could 
be used for clustering or predictive model generation activities. 
Modeling was achieved by appropriately setting up the ―input stream‖ within PASW 13 
Modeler software application. Connections were made between the data source to the various 
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selection, filtering, and typing nodes that prepped the data for analysis. Finally, appropriate modeling 
nodes that determined the classification and clustering methods used were chosen based on findings 
from the literature. For example, due to the categorical nature of the data, neural network learning 
and decision tree models were employed rather than K-means clustering. After the creation of the 
category flags, Kohonen, Two-Step, and K-means were employed as the ―categorical-only‖ data 
limitation had been removed. 
D i m e n s i o n a l i t y  r e d u c t i o n  w i t h  d i f f u s i o n  m a p s  
Text data is inherently unstructured and contains data that, if plotted, is of high dimension. 
Each word in a text document, for example, could be considered a dimension. Thus a 100-word 
record has 100 dimensions with which to contend. To manage this, methods were modified from 
those used by Underhill (2007) and Martinez (2002). An unsupervised approach to dimensionality 
reduction was chosen, as the literature indicated that a need exists for unsupervised dimensionality 
reduction in text mining. Dimensionality reduction techniques have seen varied uses in clustering 
and categorizing data. For example, Higgs et al (2006) successfully employed dimensionality 
reduction through diffusion maps to classify brain images according to species of animal from which 
brain scans were taken. 
The method employed is that described by Lafon and Lee (2006) where a diffusion distance 
between terms can be approximated to a level of precision given by δ by observing the first few q(t) 
nontrivial eigenvalues in the following relation: 
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Lafon and Lee (2006) explain that the above relation can be interpreted as a Euclidean 
distance in the linear map Rq(t) if the right eigenvectors are selected with λtj coordinates on the data. 
The following diffusion map: 
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describes the relation below 
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The dimensionality reduction and selection of the relevant eigenvectors is dictated by the 
fall-off of the eigenvalues and other factors described in more detail in Lafon and Lee (2006). The 
main idea of this process is that the distance measures between Anomaly records are preserved in 
the dimensionality reduction, these measures then afford classification by k-means clustering. 
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The Term-Frequency Inverse-Document Frequency equation specified by Underhill (2007) 
was employed to create the input data, and dimensionality reduction using diffusion maps was 
carried out on the resulting matrix. The computed document difference matrix was chosen as a 
measure of document dissimilarity. The underlying theory was that the measures of differences 
between the documents, when reduced, would suggest what level of dimensionality is required to 
categorize the documents. The below figure, modified from its original version found in Underhill 
(2007), describes the process. 
 
Figure 15: Dimensionality reduction approach (adopted from Underhill, 2007) 
Diffusion maps aim to transform distance matrices that highlight local relationships between 
points (Coifman et al, 2005). These preserved relationships are based on the number of paths that 
exist between two data points; they describe how anomaly types are connected (Underhill, 2007). 
PASW Modeler 13 was used to extract the most common words associated across all records 
with pilot anomalies. This action returned 127,766 records. Over 5,000 commonly-occurring words 
were extracted. The words were sorted in descending order by the number of documents that 
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contained them. For example, the most commonly occurring word was ―acft‖ (aircraft), and it was 
found in 41 percent, or 52,502, records. Due to memory and software constraints which will be 
described later, only 100 of these words could be used for dimensionality reduction. The 100 words 
chosen were the most frequently occurring words; these 100 words served as the input dataset for 
the clustering activity. 
A Microsoft Excel document was created that listed these 100 words across the top row 
arranged by columns, each column containing a word. PASW Modeler 13‘s category extraction 
feature was employed to create a sparsely populated term-document frequency matrix that indicated 
presence or absence as well as frequency of encounter of a given word within the anomaly record. 
This matrix was then used to calculate a document feature. The method chosen was 
described by Underhill (2007), and is called the weighted term-document matrix. To create this 
matrix, a slightly modified version of the Term-Frequency Inverse-Document Frequency formula 
was employed: 
     (  ⁄ )     (  ⁄ ) 
(11) 
In this equation, t is the frequency value of a word j appears in document i. The sum total of 
all words of interest (row sums) that appeared in a given record was term T. The term D is the total 
number of documents (127,766), and d is the number of documents that contain the term j. This 
equation led to the creation of a term-document matrix, which then could be visualized and its 
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dimensionality reduced in MATLAB. 
MATLAB r2007b was used to carry out the dimensionality reduction, with the actual 
computation carried out using freely distributable example code developed by Ann B. Lee, Associate 
Professor within the Department of Statistics at Carnegie Mellon University at the time of writing of 
this work. The code was accessed from Professor Lee‘s personal webpage (Lee, 2010). The code was 
modified in MATLAB to accept 1,000 anomaly report records containing 100-item term-document 
matrix. A random sample of 1000 anomaly reports was selected. The below table displays a 
truncated, representative sample of the input data. 
Table 9: Truncated input data for MATLAB 
apch rwy flt turn twr acft clred 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
S e l e c t i o n  o f  A n o m a l i e s  a n d  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  F a c t o r s  
The below tables show the total number of entries analyzed, broken down by Anomalies 
Reported and Total Contributing Factors Reported for those anomalies. These anomalies were 
selected due to their high occurrence rates; anomalies with less than three percent occurrence rates 
were not considered in the analysis. In addition, the ―Other‖ anomaly type was omitted as they were 
records containing non-standardized, non-categorized entries, and did not contribute any 
meaningful information to this analysis. Furthermore, this was a "write-in" field, meaning that 
respondents could input any value, thereby making it highly variable and subjective. Data in this field 
varied widely. It was difficult to interpret these data compared to the ordered sets of data present in 
the other anomaly types.  
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Table 10: Anomaly types and frequencies selected for analysis 
Anomaly Type Frequency Percent 
Deviation - Procedural 56087 43.9 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 27359 21.4 
Conflict 16537 12.9 
Inflight Event / Encounter 9676 7.6 
Deviation - Altitude 8434 6.6 
Deviation - Track / Heading 5294 4.1 
ATC Issue 4384 3.4 
Total 127771 100.0 
 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of anomalies by percentage 
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Factors contributing to anomalies are shown below. The factors were associated with 
anomalies; all were considered for analysis to maintain data consistency. The total number of records 
analyzed was 127,771. 
Table 11: Factors associated with anomalies 
Factor Type Frequency Percent 
Human Factors 72607 56.8 
Aircraft 27674 21.7 
Weather 4818 3.8 
Company Policy 4715 3.7 
Airport 3757 2.9 
Ambiguous 3112 2.4 
Chart Or Publication 2484 1.9 
Procedure 2246 1.8 
Environment - Non Weather 2046 1.6 
Airspace Structure 1902 1.5 
ATC Equipment / Nav Facil 992 .5 
Logbook Entry 608 .5 
Incorrect / Not Installed 370 .3 
Manuals 325 .3 
Staffing 54 .0 
Equipment / Tooling 33 .0 
MEL 28 .0 
Total 127771 100.0 
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Figure 17: Distribution of factors associated with anomalies 
 
Figure 18: Distribution of anomaly types 
 
Figure 19: Distribution of factor types 
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Consistent with literature findings, the most often cited and classified factor for most 
anomalies is the human element. The next most popular factor involved aircraft equipment issues. 
Weather and Company Policies were the next most popular factors underlying anomalies. The least 
frequently encountered factors were MEL issues, which are issues associated with the Minimum 
Equipment List. The MEL comprises a list of components deemed absolutely necessary for 
dispatch, and is created and maintained by the aircraft manufacturer. 
 
Figure 20: Aircraft anomalies broken down by factor type 
The above figure is a visualization of the prevalent factors contributing to each anomaly 
type. Human Factors is most commonly associated across all anomaly types save for Aircraft 
Equipment anomalies. One other notable association is that Weather is often associated with 
Inflight Event / Encounter anomalies. 
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Figure 21: Directed web of relationships between factors and anomalies 
The above figure depicts relationship strengths between factors and anomalies. Bolder lines 
denote stronger associations. These associations were determined by frequencies: the more often a 
record contained a given factor in an anomaly record, the bolder the line between the two. From the 
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above graph, it is apparent that Human Factors are strongly associated with procedural deviations. 
Aircraft issues are once again strongly associated with Aircraft Equipment anomalies. 
 
Figure 22: Network web of anomalies and factors 
The network web provides another visualization of factor and anomaly associations. In the 
above figure, several more relationships are easier to see. In addition, partitions between factor types 
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are evident. For example, Weather can contribute to Inflight Events/Encounters, but Company 
Policy is hardly ever a factor for Inflight Events/Encounters. 
D i s c u s s i o n  o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  M e t h o d s  R e s u l t s  
This part of the study investigated the pre-determined categories and labels created and 
maintained by the authors of the ASRS database (Aviation Safety Reporting System, 2002). The 
anomalies will each be discussed in turn. This study found that the most prevalent factor for all 
anomalies is Human Factors: over 56 percent of anomalies have Human Factors listed as their 
principle cause. Dekker (2005) points out that, when an accident investigation fails to find 
mechanical failures, the investigation inevitably concludes that the problem is human in nature. 
Based on this evidence, Dekker constructed an equation demonstrating the ratio of accident causes 
to human and mechanical problems: 
             (                    ) 
This sort of anecdotal evidence is shared across domains where humans must interact with 
machines. Investigators, mechanics, troubleshooters, and support representatives all are quick to 
blame the human user for issues if no hardware problems are found. 
In the Human Factors data subset, an unexpectedly high number of records indicated that 
the most frequent issue was Troubleshooting Aircraft Equipment. This is mildly surprising, as 
Aircraft Equipment anomalies were not the most prevalent anomalies encountered. Time Pressure 
accounted for the next most frequently encountered Human Factors issue. Decreased Time available 
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to make decisions and enact plans commonly led to mistakes and higher workloads. Communication 
Breakdowns and losses of Situational Awareness (SA) were related, as they both corresponded to 
appropriate information flow, integration, and processing. Workload issues were infrequently 
encountered – another surprising find, given the anecdotal evidence of pilots complaining they were 
unable to ―stay ahead of the airplane‖ during stressful situations. It is possible that workload issues 
were encompassed by the Time Pressure Human Factors category. Another notable Human Factors 
issue was that Fatigue was the least often encountered factor. Fatigue is often synonymous with 
Human Factors, as fatigue is often cited as a cause for decreased performance levels. These findings 
from the smaller Human Factors category are only representative of that reduced dataset, and 
although there are no reasons suggesting that they cannot be generalized to the entire dataset, no 
validation of this claim was performed. 
Aircraft Equipment Problems 
Aircraft issues were cited as the primary cause of Aircraft Equipment Problem anomalies in 
more than 70 percent of anomalies reported. This was an unsurprising finding, as by its very 
definition an Aircraft Equipment Problem is likely caused by faulty or incorrectly installed or 
maintained equipment. Human Factors was the second most associated factor. An example of this 
sort of incident, and one in which an Aircraft Equipment Problem was illustrated, was found in this 
excerpt of record 80386:  
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…Became colder but nowhere near debilitating. Nevertheless, definitely a 
preoccupation. Thought about advising ctlrs at slc or den center about situation but 
didn't think it would cause a prob. Clred to descended and then to byson intxn, i 
thought to cross byson at or above 16000'. I'm fairly certain that i read it back that 
way. After byson, i was handed off to the next ctlr who said that the previous one 
wanted to know why i had not crossed at 16000'. I told him that i thought i was to 
cross at or above. Then, apching the arpt, i noticed that the lights on my avionics 
were off. Because of the cold i had put on a sport jacket and then a massive, bulky 
overcoat. A buckle on the coat had snagged the avionics master switch and turned 
the avionics off… 
The above report, though classified as an Aircraft Equipment Problem, was caused by the 
pilot being too cold and donning a coat that became snagged on a control switch. The pilot did not 
notice that the avionics package which broadcasted important aircraft data had been turned off until 
notified by an air traffic controller. It is important to realize that certain seemingly simple anomalies 
may have unorthodox causes. 
Altitude Deviations 
The most frequently associated factor for Altitude Deviations was Human Factors. The 
overwhelming majority of Altitude Deviations, at more than 70 percent, was due to Human Factors 
issues. The most common reasons for these deviations were breakdowns in communication with air 
traffic controllers (ATC). Many reports claimed ATC issued requests that were unable to be met, or 
there were misunderstandings, and these misunderstandings persisted because the read-back to the 
controllers was not closely scrutinized. The literature supports this finding: modern aviation systems 
are highly connected information flow systems. If the flow of information is interrupted or 
corrupted, long-reaching, cascading effects can manifest themselves (Vidulich et al, 2010). 
The second most frequently cited factor was Aircraft issues. Problems with aircraft 
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equipment can either indicate improper altitude or provide an indication of another condition that 
could lead to an altitude deviation. For example, report number 779973 describes a situation where a 
pilot received a climb indication from a faulty sensor onboard the aircraft. The autopilot was on, and 
so the aircraft attempted to descend to compensate for this sudden climb indication. The other 
factor types were too weakly associated to be of any explanatory value. 
ATC Issues 
Human Factors were overwhelmingly associated with ATC Issues, comprising more than 82 
percent of the anomaly reports. Most of these problems cited inattention or incomplete information 
being relayed between controllers and pilots or ground crew. Specific associated factors were 
communications breakdowns, delays in communication, or no communication at all. 
Report number 901082 illustrates an interesting example of an ATC issue. The pilot landed 
the airplane but stated that the landing was anomalous. Upon further investigation, the tower‘s 
weather equipment was malfunctioning, causing the wrong runway to be assigned by ATC. ASRS 
classified this incident as ―Human Factors,‖ despite a definite problem with equipment. A miss-
classified record such as this demonstrates the need for powerful and accurate classification 
algorithms and methods.  
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…I was advised to report a 3 mile final for Runway 22. I requested a wind check. 
The report from the Tower was "Zero Seven Zero at ..., Gusting 14". I don't recall 
the exact wind (I believe it was 9 MPH)… …On final approach, the airplane did 
not "settle" correctly and was very "squirrelly" on short final. I noted that even 
though my airspeed was 70 KTS, the ground was moving way quicker than it 
should have been for the given winds from ATC… …At this point, a pilot on the 
ground radioed the tower and said that the windsock was definitely from the West. 
At that point, the Tower explained that the wind gauge equipment was up for 
maintenance the day before and that there was some sort of problem... 
Conflicts 
Conflict anomalies overwhelmingly had Human Factors cited as a primary contributor. Most 
conflicts occurred due to contributing factors like communication breakdowns or loss of situational 
awareness. The only other notable factor to contribute to Conflict anomalies was Weather. Poor 
visibility and deteriorating conditions leading to deviations or forced landings and inadequate 
separation all contribute to Conflicts. Text reports from records matching these conditions support 
these findings. 
Inflight Events/Encounters 
Most Inflight Events/Encounters were caused by Human Factors issues (67 percent), but a 
strong contributor was Weather (26 percent of anomaly reports). These findings are also consistent 
with literature reports. Limited or divided attention to the environment, both internal and external 
to the airplane, could lead to situations that cascade out of control. One situation analogous to 
certain concepts found in the literature is that selective attention in humans operates in a serial 
fashion, whereas external events are parallel. The spreading of responsibility to controllers and other 
crew members, automation, and integration of displays are all methods that can be employed to 
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manage these types of situations (Vidulich et al, 2010). 
Procedural Deviations 
The frequency analysis revealed that the most prevalent anomaly type encountered was 
Procedural Deviation. This is consistent with many findings in the literature, which cite deviations 
from protocol, missed steps in a checklist, (Dekker, 2005) or other breakdowns in human resource 
management. 
Track/Heading Deviations 
The Deviations-type anomalies all had an overwhelming percentage of Human Factors 
issues listed as the primary contributor. Track/Heading Deviations ascribed 70 percent of records to 
Human Factors issues. Most of these issues comprised divided attention, fatigue, breakdowns in 
communication with ATC, and loss of SA. These findings again coincide with those of Durso and 
Alexander (2010), who began their paper with a Track/Heading deviation fictional scenario to 
illustrate how SA can be lost during both high and low workload conditions. 
The only other notable contributor to anomalies concerning Track/Heading is that of 
Aircraft issues (8 percent). Similar to the Altitude Deviation anomaly, malfunctioning, inoperative, 
or incorrectly indicating equipment can very easily lead to an Altitude/Track Deviation, especially in 
inclement weather conditions.  
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I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  F a c t o r s  a n d  A n o m a l i e s  i n  t h e  H u m a n  
F a c t o r s  S u b s e t  
The ASRS created categories and began tracking Human Factors data in June of 2009. This 
reduced dataset containing Human Factors category data contains 8,817 records. These records were 
analyzed separately to glean additional insights not found in the larger dataset. 
Table 12: Human factors categories frequencies 
 Frequency Percent 
Troubleshooting 3459 39.2 
Time Pressure 2487 28.2 
Communication 
Breakdown 
760 8.6 
Situational Awareness 730 8.3 
Workload 386 4.4 
Training / Qualification 350 4.0 
Other / Unknown 207 2.3 
Human-Machine 
Interface 
190 2.2 
Confusion 124 1.4 
Distraction 70 .8 
Physiological - Other 32 .4 
Fatigue 22 .2 
Total 8817 100.0 
 
The above categories show that trouble shooting aircraft equipment and time pressure are 
the most common contributors to aircraft anomalies for the study period. Surprisingly, fatigue, 
distraction, and confusion are not categorized particularly prominently as contributors to aircraft 
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anomalies. 
 
Figure 23: Frequencies of anomaly types in the human factors dataset 
The above figure shows the frequencies of anomalies in the reduced Human Factors dataset. 
The most prominent anomaly types found in the Human Factors dataset were Procedural 
Deviations and Aircraft Equipment Problems. In light of these frequencies, the high counts of 
troubleshooting and time pressure as human factors contributors to anomalies appear to follow 
logically. 
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Figure 24: Normalized frequencies of anomalies and human factors contributors 
The above frequency plot shows which human factors issues contributed to anomalies. 
Troubleshooting and Time Pressure were often associated with Aircraft Equipment Problems and 
Procedural Deviations. The normalized plot reveals that Situational Awareness was often a 
contributor to airborne Conflict anomalies, an association that the standard frequency counts do not 
readily reveal. Human-Machine Interface issues, which constitute a wrong button press or incorrect 
control operation, were also present across all anomaly types. The category Other / Unknown did 
not contribute any meaningful knowledge to the study. 
The reduced dataset containing roughly 9,000 anomaly reports provided limited insights on 
what specific Human Factors issues exist that contribute to these anomaly occurrences. The most 
frequently encountered Human Factors issue was Troubleshooting. Troubleshooting involves 
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conditions where aircraft equipment is malfunctioning, and the flight crew must take time away 
from managing flight to ascertaining what the issue is. Most anomaly reports involved the pilots 
troubleshooting the automation. The vast majority of problems were problems with the autopilot. 
Most records had more than one Human Factors issue associated with them. Common co-
associations were Time Pressure and Troubleshooting, Situational Awareness and Time Pressure, 
and Human-Machine Interface and Troubleshooting. Because of the way in which ASRS maintains 
records, those anomaly reports that do contain Human Factors data contain multiple 
categorizations; no one factor is singled out as the primary issue. Unfortunately, the ASRS database 
only recently began categorizing Human Factors data. Human behaviors are highly complex; placing 
any one issue into a category is very difficult. This was the primary reason why this study did not 
limit itself to human factors-related anomalies.  
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R e l a t i n g  F a c t o r s  t o  A n o m a l i e s  T r o u g h  C r o s s - t a b u l a t i o n  
 
Figure 25: Results of cross tabulations in factor and anomaly frequencies 
The above figure displays the results of the cross tabulation activity. The column totals 
reveal which factors are most prevalent in each anomaly category. Notable frequencies in the 
Human Factors row (which makes up the majority of the counts) are Airborne Conflicts and 
Altitude Deviations. The chart also shows that most factor categories aside from the Human Factors 
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row account for less than 10 percent of anomalies. The last, somewhat trivial, relationship is that 
Aircraft Issues account for 15 percent of Aircraft Equipment Problems. 
Cross tabulations results did not contribute any additional findings to those identified by the 
statistical frequency analysis. The main findings were that Human Factors issues are present in most 
anomaly reports. Human Factors are cited as the primary cause more than half of the time, in five 
out of the seven anomalies investigated. Of these two anomalies, only Aircraft Equipment Problem 
had another factor more strongly associated with it than Human Factors. 
This finding reveals that either human error or decision making is truly to blame for most 
aircraft anomalies, or else database administrators and those completing the reports are quick to 
assign blame to the human for problems. One interesting aside to accident investigation might be to 
ask how often human contributions ―saved‖ the situation or prevented a serious incident. A notable 
example of this is US Airways Flight 1549, which made a water landing in the Hudson River in New 
York City after suffering a catastrophic engine failure due to multiple bird ingestion. In that 
situation, the pilot made the ―correct‖ decision to attempt a water landing rather than try to divert to 
another airfield without any engine power. The pilot came to this decision and executed the landing 
while ATC was struggling to catch up and clear the airspace (Eisen et al, 2009). 
R e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e t w e e n  F a c t o r s  a n d  A n o m a l i e s  
Consistent with the methods defined by Clausen (1998) and applied by Hobbs & Williamson 
(2003), correspondence analysis was carried out using SPSS r17. The categories shown below are 
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representations of the chi-square distances between the categories. Those categories appearing closer 
together on the plot are more closely associated than those further apart. 
 
Figure 26: Correspondence analysis plot for factors 
The above correspondence plot shows how closely associated individual factors are based on 
their chi-square distance. Non-Weather related Environmental issues and Weather were most 
disassociated from the other factor types. Procedural factors, Human Factors issues, Procedural 
issues, ATC Equipment and Navigational Facility issues, and Airspace Structure all were highly 
associated. Logbook Entry problems, unclear Manuals, issues pertaining Master Equipment List, 
Equipment/Tooling problems, and Installation problems were all closely associated, as these are 
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maintenance-related factors. Aircraft issues were slightly disassociated from the maintenance factors 
group, but still showed signs of association with these factors. 
 
Figure 27: Correspondence analysis plot for anomalies 
The above correspondence plot shows a high level of association between the inflight-
related events ATC issues, Procedural Deviations, Track/Heading Deviations, and Altitude 
Deviations. Further disassociated from these are Aircraft Equipment Problems, and Inflight 
Events/Encounters. 
99 
 
Figure 28: Correspondence analysis plot of factors and anomalies 
The above figure shows the anomalies and factors plots superimposed on each other. It 
demonstrates closely the associations between Aircraft issues and Aircraft Equipment anomalies. 
Next, Chart or Publication issues, problems with Manuals, Airport issues, Logbook Entry errors, 
and discrepancies with Company Policies are all closely associated with the three Deviation 
anomalies (Track/Heading, Altitude, and Procedural). Human Factors as a factor is very closely 
associated with all anomalies save for Aircraft Equipment problems and Inflight 
Events/Encounters. The disassociated factors are Non-Weather related Environmental issues, and 
Weather issues. Inflight Events/Encounters is associated between the two Environmental factors. 
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The value of the findings of correspondence analysis was not limited to identifying known 
associations between anomalies and factors, but also described a powerful visualization of 
correlations and associations. Concepts that were intuitively related and supported by data such as 
Aircraft Equipment Problems and Aircraft issues were displayed in close proximity to each other, as 
might have been expected. All of the human decision and procedural anomalies and factors also 
clustered together. Seemingly random events beyond the control of the flight crew, such as Weather 
issues or Non-Weather Environmental problems were distanced from the other related anomaly and 
factor types. This method has already seen successful use in linking contributing factors to 
maintenance errors in Hobbs & Williamson (2003). The results here further demonstrate its 
usefulness in visualizing categorical data in order to make inferences about associations and possible 
causes. 
P r e d i c t i n g  A n o m a l i e s  f r o m  F a c t o r  D a t a  
The anomalies and factor classifications were placed into a multinomial logistic regression 
algorithm in an attempt to create a predictive model capable of classifying anomalies based on 
contributing factors information. Standard binomial logistic regression could not be employed 
because the dependent variable being predicted had more than two values.  
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Table 13: Multinomial logistic regression results 
Factor Anomaly 
Frequency Percentage 
Observed Predicted 
Aircraft Aircraft Equipment Problem 19663 71.1% 
Altitude Deviation 905 3.3% 
ATC Issue 90 .3% 
Conflict 561 2.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 1021 3.7% 
Procedural Deviation 4989 18.0% 
Track / Heading Deviation 445 1.6% 
Airport Aircraft Equipment Problem 336 8.9% 
Altitude Deviation 34 .9% 
ATC Issue 64 1.7% 
Conflict 816 21.7% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 313 8.3% 
Procedural Deviation 2113 56.2% 
Track / Heading Deviation 81 2.2% 
Airspace Structure Aircraft Equipment Problem 79 4.2% 
Altitude Deviation 112 5.9% 
ATC Issue 110 5.8% 
Conflict 399 21.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 114 6.0% 
Procedural Deviation 989 52.0% 
Track / Heading Deviation 99 5.2% 
Ambiguous Aircraft Equipment Problem 304 9.8% 
Altitude Deviation 351 11.3% 
ATC Issue 122 3.9% 
Conflict 797 25.6% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 226 7.3% 
Procedural Deviation 1098 35.3% 
Track / Heading Deviation 214 6.9% 
ATC Equipment 
/ Nav Facil 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 71 7.2% 
Altitude Deviation 61 6.1% 
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ATC Issue 69 7.0% 
Conflict 159 16.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 94 9.5% 
Procedural Deviation 394 39.7% 
Track / Heading Deviation 144 14.5% 
Chart Or 
Publication 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 563 22.7% 
Altitude Deviation 83 3.3% 
ATC Issue 12 .5% 
Conflict 44 1.8% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 58 2.3% 
Procedural Deviation 1586 63.8% 
Track / Heading Deviation 138 5.6% 
Company Policy Aircraft Equipment Problem 746 15.8% 
Altitude Deviation 61 1.3% 
ATC Issue 36 .8% 
Conflict 253 5.4% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 189 4.0% 
Procedural Deviation 3355 71.2% 
Track / Heading Deviation 75 1.6% 
Environment - 
Non Weather 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 259 12.7% 
Altitude Deviation 131 6.4% 
ATC Issue 32 1.6% 
Conflict 184 9.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 565 27.6% 
Procedural Deviation 810 39.6% 
Track / Heading Deviation 65 3.2% 
Equipment / 
Tooling 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 5 15.2% 
Altitude Deviation 0 .0% 
ATC Issue 2 6.1% 
Conflict 1 3.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 1 3.0% 
Procedural Deviation 24 72.7% 
Track / Heading Deviation 0 .0% 
Human Factors Aircraft Equipment Problem 4559 6.3% 
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Altitude Deviation 6232 8.6% 
ATC Issue 3627 5.0% 
Conflict 12585 17.3% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 4321 6.0% 
Procedural Deviation 37543 51.7% 
Track / Heading Deviation 3740 5.2% 
Incorrect / Not 
Installed 
Aircraft Equipment Problem 108 29.2% 
Altitude Deviation 8 2.2% 
ATC Issue 6 1.6% 
Conflict 31 8.4% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 9 2.4% 
Procedural Deviation 205 55.4% 
Track / Heading Deviation 3 .8% 
Logbook Entry Aircraft Equipment Problem 148 24.3% 
Altitude Deviation 0 .0% 
ATC Issue 0 .0% 
Conflict 0 .0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 1 .2% 
Procedural Deviation 458 75.3% 
Track / Heading Deviation 1 .2% 
Manuals Aircraft Equipment Problem 85 26.2% 
Altitude Deviation 1 .3% 
ATC Issue 2 .6% 
Conflict 0 .0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 7 2.2% 
Procedural Deviation 230 70.8% 
Track / Heading Deviation 0 .0% 
MEL Aircraft Equipment Problem 8 28.6% 
Altitude Deviation 0 .0% 
ATC Issue 0 .0% 
Conflict 0 .0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 0 .0% 
Procedural Deviation 20 71.4% 
Track / Heading Deviation 0 .0% 
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Procedure Aircraft Equipment Problem 112 5.0% 
Altitude Deviation 126 5.6% 
ATC Issue 158 7.0% 
Conflict 477 21.2% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 242 10.8% 
Procedural Deviation 1031 45.9% 
Track / Heading Deviation 100 4.5% 
Staffing Aircraft Equipment Problem 3 5.6% 
Altitude Deviation 0 .0% 
ATC Issue 5 9.3% 
Conflict 7 13.0% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 5 9.3% 
Procedural Deviation 32 59.3% 
Track / Heading Deviation 2 3.7% 
Weather Aircraft Equipment Problem 310 6.4% 
Altitude Deviation 329 6.8% 
ATC Issue 49 1.0% 
Conflict 223 4.6% 
Inflight Event / Encounter 2510 52.1% 
Procedural Deviation 1210 25.1% 
Track / Heading Deviation 187 3.9% 
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Table 14: Classification table of aircraft anomalies 
Observed 
Predicted 
Aircraft 
Equipment 
Problem 
Altitude 
Deviation 
ATC 
Issue Conflict 
Inflight 
Event / 
Encounter 
Procedural 
Deviation 
Track / 
Heading 
Deviation 
Percent 
Correct 
Aircraft Equipment 
Problem 
19663 0 0 0 310 7386 0 71.9% 
Altitude Deviation 905 0 0 0 329 7200 0 .0% 
ATC Issue 90 0 0 0 49 4245 0 .0% 
Conflict 561 0 0 0 223 15753 0 .0% 
Inflight Event / 
Encounter 
1021 0 0 0 2510 6145 0 25.9% 
Procedural 
Deviation 
4989 0 0 0 1210 49888 0 88.9% 
Track / Heading 
Deviation 
445 0 0 0 187 4662 0 .0% 
Overall Percentage 21.7% .0% .0% .0% 3.8% 74.6% .0% 56.4% 
 
Table 15: Goodness-of-fit measures 
Pseudo R-Square 
Cox and Snell .378 
Nagelkerke .395 
McFadden .150 
 
The above classification table shows mixed results in the model‘s ability to predict aircraft 
anomalies from factors data. The overall accuracy of the model is 56.4 percent, and the model is best 
at predicting Procedural Deviation Anomalies and Aircraft Equipment problems. This is due to the 
high levels of association between single factors such as Human Factors issues or Aircraft 
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Equipment problems and the predicted anomaly. Those anomalies that have fewer occurrences of 
individual factors are harder to predict, as less information exists. 
The pseudo R-squared scores provide a rough measure of the model‘s ability to account for 
variability in the data. The two commonly used scores shown in the above table, Cox and Snell and 
Nagelkerke; both demonstrate that the model can explain roughly 40 percent of the variability in the 
input data. 
The classification table resulting from the regression findings demonstrated an overall model 
accuracy of 56 percent. This is significant because it assigns some underlying pattern to factors and 
anomalies. When some information about the factors that contribute to an anomaly exists, the 
anomaly can be predicted at levels better than chance. 
This figure is misleading, as individual model accuracy for single anomalies was much higher. 
For example, the model was able to identify almost 89 percent of Procedural Deviations, and nearly 
72 percent of Aircraft Equipment Problem anomalies. This was likely due to the fact that these two 
anomalies had overwhelmingly single factors. Specifically, Human Factors issues usually indicated a 
Procedural Deviation, as these types of anomalies were by far the most often encountered. Namely, 
when Human Factors issues are present, it is highly likely that a Procedural Deviation will occur. 
The goodness of fit analysis, at best, reported that the logistic model could only account for 
about 40 percent of the variability in the data. This is a reasonable ―real-world‖ figure, as most 
―acceptable‖ or ―good‖ R-Squared values hover around 0.5, meaning they can explain half of the 
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variability in the data. The model was better at correctly identifying those anomalies that had more 
contributing anomaly records. The anomalies that had few definite factors associated with them 
were harder for the model to predict correctly. These findings demonstrate that, given enough input 
data, multinomial logistic regression can identify anomalies from factors, albeit with a level of 
reliability dependent on amount of data available. 
This type of approach has been employed by epidemiological studies, which investigated 
what factors were present to determine whether they contributed to a disease or not. The main 
difference between the two is that epidemiological studies look for a ―flag‖ value, i.e., ―yes‖ the 
patient has the disease or ―no‖ he does not, assuming certain risk factors exist. Thoraval et al (1997), 
for example, published a study linking risk factors that affected the severity of Hepatitis C. 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  A c t i v e  a n d  L a t e n t  F a c t o r s  f r o m  A n o m a l y  
R e p o r t s  
Categories 
PASW Modeler 13 analyzed the 127,776 text records associated with anomalies. The results 
of the categories extracted from the records are shown below:  
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Table 16: Concept counts extracted from text data 
Concepts Records Containing Percentage 
Unsafe Conditions 50625 39.60% 
Rule-Based Errors 33161 26.00% 
Uncategorized 27855 21.80% 
Skill-Based Errors 25073 19.60% 
Weather 21818 17.10% 
Knowledge-Based Errors 19054 14.90% 
Aircraft Issues 10110 7.90% 
Violations 5287 4.10% 
Unsafe Supervision 271 0.20% 
Perceptual Errors 55 0.00% 
Total 127766 100.0% 
 
The most commonly extracted category was the one containing concepts related to unsafe 
conditions, followed by rule-based errors, then skill-based errors, followed by knowledge based 
errors. Approximately 22 percent of the records were not categorized by the text mining algorithm, 
meaning they did not contain any of the keywords sought out by the algorithm. 
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Figure 29: Frequencies of categories extracted from text data 
Types 
The below table displays the types of concepts extracted, counts of how many occurrences 
of a given type there were, and how many records contained that type. Types were constructed from 
concepts (frequently occurring words in the corpus); a group of related concepts sharing a common 
meaning or theme was grouped into a type.  
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Table 17: Types of concepts extracted 
Types 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Number of Records 
Containing This Type 
   
<Unknown> 3116095 127761 
<Routine Behaviors> 192086 87198 
<Non-Routine 
Behaviors> 65826 43003 
<Rule-Based> 45520 32584 
<Skill-Based> 37748 25004 
<Weather> 36243 21508 
<Knowledge-Based> 24076 19054 
<Violation> 6150 5192 
 
The unknown (or uncategorized) type was the most often encountered type within the 
anomaly report corpus. Concepts associated with routine behaviors made up the first meaningful 
type. These were concepts such as approach, cruise flight, and landing. The next most prevalent and 
utilized type was Non-Routine Behaviors; more than 43,000 records contained a concept or word 
associated with actions taken by the pilot that were extraordinary in nature. Concepts grouped into 
Rule-based and Skill-based error types were the next most often encountered, followed by Weather 
and Knowledge-Based types. Violation types were encountered in 5,192 of the records mined. 
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Figure 30: Counts of number of records in which each type appears 
The above chart displays the number of documents that contained each type of concept. 
Routine Behaviors made up the vast majority of these records. The next most prevalent type found 
was Non-Routine Behaviors. Finally, the Skill-Based, Rule-Based, and Knowledge-Based error types 
followed. Weather types were found in about 22,000 records. 
The types extracted from the record corpus were made up of ―concepts,‖ or frequently 
encountered words representing a grander whole or concept. As with the categories, most words 
extracted had no type associated with them, and were left unclassified as <Unknown>. A full list of 
the types created and their component keywords can be found in the Appendix. 
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Routine Behaviors was the ―control‖ type, created initially as a test to see how the system 
would handle parsing concepts into words. No analysis or links were performed with this type, but it 
was left as an indicator to assure the system was performing correctly. 
Non-Routine Behaviors constituted extreme maneuvers, troubleshooting, evasion, unruly 
passengers, and other nonstandard keywords identified by the literature. Over 43,000 anomaly 
reports contained at least one reference to non-routine behaviors, many containing multiple 
instances of Non-Routine Behaviors. This was demonstrated by the existence of more than 65,000 
recorded instances of this type. 
Rule-Based concepts were the next most frequently encountered type. This type was linked 
to the Rule-Based Error category, and contained concepts such as bad decision, wrong impression, 
―I was sure,‖ and other keywords that would lead to an incorrect action. Pilots making Rule-Based 
errors often apply an inappropriate action plan or decision to a situation, but are sure they are 
making the right decision. Reason (1990) calls these types of impressions ―strong but wrong.‘ These 
types were hard to identify, as most Rule-Based errors are domain specific and described in terms 
restricted to a given domain; it is very challenging to create generic keywords to identify Rule-Based 
error types. 
Skill-Based concepts comprised the next most frequently encountered type. Skill-based error 
types were easier to identify than Rule-Based types, as they were usually generic actions such as 
―pushed the wrong button,‖ ―pulled the wrong lever,‖ ―I forgot,‖ ―oversight,‖ and other such 
generic error terms. Reason (1990) uses these terms in several scenarios to describe the differences 
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between the three error types. 
Weather types were the ―low-hanging fruit‖ in mining the record corpus; however, weather 
as a factor in anomalies would generally have to be undesirable weather. This prompted keywords 
such as low visibility, turbulence, rain, ice, and IMC, or Instrument Meteorological Conditions, 
signifying that safe flight by using information available through the windshield was not possible. 
Weather was a factor in 21,508 anomaly reports. This count was higher than the number of anomaly 
reports that had Weather listed as a primary factor associated with the anomaly. This suggests that 
either the Weather type was too generic, or perhaps weather was a more serious contributing factor 
to anomalies than the frequency counts suggest. 
Knowledge-Based types were the next most frequently encountered type. These types 
comprised keywords such as unfamiliar, unsure, did not know, and student. Student was chosen 
because many anomaly reports were from instructors training student pilots. These student pilots 
would commit knowledge-based errors, as many did not have the requisite knowledge of a 
procedure or checklist, which in turn contributed to anomalies. Knowledge-based errors usually 
involve problem-solving activities, as new or not frequently accessed or applied knowledge must be 
recalled. This can take time, or the knowledge recalled may be inaccurate or incomplete, thus 
contributing to onsets of anomalies. 
The final type extracted was Violations. Violations were identified with keywords such as 
exceeded, inebriated, overspeed, too fast, and violated. Unfortunately, many of the aviation 
violations were encoded or abbreviated and all could not be identified. Generic terms implying 
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violations were used for this part of the study. 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  L a t e n t  a n d  A c t i v e  F a c t o r s  
The PASW Modeler 13 Text Analytics feature was used to construct document webs 
examining strengths of associations of categories within records. These are shown in the web 
diagrams in the below figures. Lines that are bolder denote stronger relationships, that is, higher 
frequencies of occurrences of categories within records. The size of the Category dot representation 
itself represents the number of anomaly reports containing the category.  
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Human Error Categories 
 
Figure 31: Skill-based errors category web 
Skill-based errors are frequently found within anomaly reports along with Rule-Based errors, 
as well as Unsafe Conditions. There is a weaker association found with Weather, as well as a tenuous 
association with Violations. 
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Figure 32: Rule-based errors category web 
Rule-Based Error types are found alongside Skill-Based errors, and have a high association 
with Unsafe Conditions. There are weak associations with Perceptual Errors and Violations. Rule-
Based Error types also share some association with Weather and Knowledge-Based Errors in 
anomaly reports.  
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Figure 33: Knowledge-based errors category web 
Knowledge-Based Error types appear to be weakly associated with Perceptual Errors and 
Violations. There are strong associations with Unsafe Conditions types, Rule-Based Errors, and 
Skill-Based Errors. Knowledge-Based Error types have some associative qualities with Weather 
types as well. 
118 
 
Figure 34: Perceptual errors category web 
Perceptual Error types were strongly associated with Weather types, as well as Rule-Based 
Error types and Unsafe Conditions. There were light associations to Skill-Based Error types and 
Knowledge-Based Error types. The weakest associations were with Violation types. 
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Supervisory and Administrative Categories 
 
Figure 35: Unsafe supervision category web 
Unsafe Supervision types were strongly associated with Violation types. The other 
associations were too trivial and few in number to merit consideration. 
120 
 
Figure 36: Violations category web 
Violations types were associated with many other categories, including all three types of 
Human Error types, as well as Weather and Unsafe Conditions types. Although violations were not 
common by magnitude in number of records, they were frequently associated with other factor 
types. 
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Latent and Active Factors Categories 
 
Figure 37: Aircraft issues category web 
Aircraft issues types were those associated with equipment malfunctions. They were strongly 
associated with Unsafe Conditions types, and also were loosely associated with the three Error types 
as well as Weather types. There was a very weak association with violations. 
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Figure 38: Unsafe conditions category web 
The Unsafe Conditions type had associations with all three Human Error types, with the 
strongest association being the Rule-Based Error type. It also was associated with Weather types. 
There was a weak link with Perceptual Errors. 
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Figure 39: Weather category web 
The Weather category type was loosely associated with Skill and Knowledge-Based Error 
types. It also was strongly associated with Rule-Based Errors and Unsafe Conditions. Weather had a 
tenuous relationship with Violations. 
A s s o c i a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  L a t e n t  a n d  A c t i v e  C o n t r i b u t o r s  t o  
A n o m a l i e s  
The categories created were associated with each individual anomaly report, and were used 
to create a structured means of clustering the data. The categories were placed into columns, and a 
flag was assigned to each column and row indicating the presence of that category within the 
anomaly report. These flags thereby provided the non-categorical data element that could be used to 
create clusters of the data, in order to demonstrate how supervised text mining could be used to 
create new associations for factors contributing to anomaly reports. 
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This part of the analysis employed the ―Assessments‖ data column, and the output cluster 
column from each respective clustering method. The clustering methods employed were Kohonen 
Self-Organizing Maps, Two-Step Clustering, and K-Means. After running the clustering operation, 
the generated clusters were compared to the manually categorized anomaly data to evaluate 
clustering performance. All operations were run for one pass on the data. 
Cluster Summary Data 
 
Figure 40: Summary of the Kohonen clustering operation 
The Kohonen clustering algorithm transformed the 9 category flags into 9 clusters. The 
internal measure of cluster cohesion and separation was regarded as ―fair‖ by the software. 
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Figure 41: Summary of the two-step clustering operation 
The Two-Step clustering algorithm produced 8 clusters; these 8 clusters scored a ―fair‖ 
measure of cohesion and separation. The clusters were much more even in terms of size as 
compared with the Kohonen clusters generated. 
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Figure 42: Summary of the K-Means clustering operation 
The K-Means clustering operation produced 7 clusters, with one containing nearly 47 
percent of the data analyzed. The measure of cohesion and separation is fair/poor for this clustering 
operation. 
Cluster Comparisons with Assessments 
The clusters generated were compared with the assessments assigned by the maintainers of 
the ASRS database in order to determine whether any of the algorithms employed could serve as 
automated classification tools. The reference ―clustering‖ in the form of assessment categories 
generated by the ASRS development team is presented in the below figure: 
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Figure 43: "Clustering" as organized by ASRS anomaly types 
The above figure shows how the various Assessments are broken down across Anomaly 
types. Human Factors is the most prevalent factor for all anomalies save for Aircraft Equipment 
problems, whose most commonly occurring factor is Aircraft issues. The largest ―cluster‖ that was 
created by the Anomaly partitioning method was Procedural Deviations, with 56,087 anomaly 
reports. Aircraft Equipment problems and Conflicts were the next largest clusters, with 27,539 and 
16,537 anomaly reports, respectively. The remaining clusters all had fewer than 10,000 anomaly 
reports associated with them.  
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Kohonen Self-Organizing Map Clustering 
 
Figure 44: Clustered bar chart of Kohonen clustering operation 
The Kohonen clustering operation created 11 clusters, each with a varied assortment of 
Assessments. The most prevalent Assessment found in all clusters was Weather, followed by Human 
Factors. Some clusters were much larger than others. The largest cluster was the X=3, Y=0 cluster, 
with 34,581 anomaly reports categorized. There were three other large clusters, containing 27,700, 
20,962, and 16,093 anomaly reports. The remaining clusters all had fewer than 10,000 anomaly 
reports categorized within them.  
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Two-Step Clustering 
 
Figure 45: Clustered bar chart of the Two-Step clustering operation 
The Two-Step clustering algorithm produced 8 clusters, each containing a sizeable portion 
of the anomaly reports. The most prevalent assessment by count found in each cluster was Human 
Factors. Weather was the second most prevalent assessment found in each cluster. This clustering 
method spread the various assessments throughout each cluster. Most clusters contained about 
20,000 anomaly reports, with only clusters 3 and 4 having 4,456 and 9,816 anomaly reports 
associated with them, respectively. 
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K-Means Clustering 
 
Figure 46: Clustered bar chart of the K-Means clustering operation 
The K-Means clustering algorithm produced the above output. Cluster 1 had over 87,920 
anomaly reports associated with it, with Human Factors and Aircraft issues being the most prevalent 
assessments found associated with that cluster. The other clusters, save for the largest Cluster 2, 
which contained 17,456 records, all contained fewer than 10,000 anomaly reports. This clustering 
method created an output very similar to the classification used by the ASRS database 
administrators. However, the output was not identical; the value of Cohen‘s kappa for clustering 
agreement was -0.015. The results of the classification are shown below.  
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Table 18: Classification analysis of k-means clustering algorithm 
  K-Means Cluster Number  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
Anomaly 
Type 
Deviation - 
Procedural 
26152 5974 4213 6168 2562 4019 6999 56087 
Aircraft Equipment 
Problem 
15679 2258 526 1593 535 2522 4246 27359 
Deviation - Track / 
Heading 
1581 678 923 1125 182 339 466 5294 
Inflight Event / 
Encounter 
2859 3792 403 456 362 694 1110 9676 
ATC Issue 2024 385 408 700 106 331 430 4384 
Deviation - Altitude 4024 836 689 804 326 978 777 8434 
Conflict 7705 1779 1411 2319 479 1193 1651 16537 
Total 60024 15702 8573 13165 4552 10076 15679 127771 
 
Table 19: Cohen's kappa for k-means cluster agreement 
Measures of Agreement 
  
Value 
Asymp. Std. 
Error Approx. T Approx. Sig. 
Measure of 
Agreement 
Kappa -.015 .001 -10.656 .000 
N of Valid Cases 127771     
 
Text Mining Predictive Models 
The categories that were created and flagged for each anomaly report record were then used 
to create a predictive model. The intended aim was to determine whether, by mining for the created 
categories, and given identified categories as an input, the model could correctly classify the record 
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according to Anomaly type. A Neural Network predictive model was employed within PASW 
Modeler 13. The model summary is shown below. The output column was compared to the actual 
Anomaly category column. 
Table 20: Neural Network model accuracy 
Results for output field Anomaly 
Comparing $N-Anomaly with Anomaly 
   
Correct 72,162 56.48% 
Wrong 55,609 43.52% 
Total 127,771  
 
The model was only able to correctly classify about 56 percent of the Anomaly reports based 
on the 9 inputs of the category flags. The model was trained 5 times. 
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Figure 47: Predictive performance of neural network model 
The Neural Network model was able to accurately identify Aircraft Equipment Problems 
and Procedural Deviations. However, it was unable to reproduce the other three anomalies based on 
the category flag data alone. 
The three clustering algorithms produced markedly different results. All of the algorithms 
employed were able to generate clusters with a ―Fair‖ rating on cohesion and separation. 
Kohonen 
The Kohonen clustering algorithm generated 11 clusters. These clusters were very varied in 
size, ranging from 723 anomaly reports to 34,581 anomaly reports. No meaning or structure was 
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apparent in these generated clusters. 
Kohonen clustering trains a neural network to cluster elements that tend to be similar to 
each other. The Kohonen clustering algorithm used within PASW Modeler 13 employs a network 
with an input layer and an output map, consisting of nodes with connections between the nodes. 
Kohonen maps are also used for dimensionality reduction, as many inputs become summarized into 
a few output features that preserve the underlying structure of the inputs; Kohonen maps can 
produce similar outputs to factor analysis or principle component analysis (PCA) (Kohonen, 1998). 
The network is ―trained‖ through the presentation of data to the input layer, and these 
values are propagated through the network to the output layer. The network is ―trained‖ repeatedly 
by adjusting the connection strengths between the input and output connection values, so that the 
outputs better match patterns of inputs presented to the network. The training results in the creation 
of a two-dimensional ―map,‖ which organizes itself based on the training activity (hence the term 
self-organizing-map, or SOM). 
 
Figure 48: Input and output nodes in a Kohonen network 
The above figure demonstrates connections from one node to the output nodes in a 
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Kohonen map. The input nodes are the nodes below the grid, and the grid represents the output 
layer. All input nodes are connected to the output layer – but these connections have been omitted 
for clarity. Kohonen maps, when trained, uncover which input records summarize or are similar to 
the majority of records, called ―strong units.‖ Conversely, the records that are different from the 
majority form ―weak units.‖ The strong units become the cluster centers (Kohonen, 1998). 
Kohonen self-organizing maps were not the best choice for document clustering operations. 
The high dimensionality and variability of the input patterns likely left the algorithm with many 
―weak units,‖ and few ―strong units‖ around which to build appropriate clusters. 
Two-Step 
The Two-Step algorithm produced 8 clusters that were more uniform in size compared to 
those produced by the Kohonen algorithm. The Two-Step algorithm appeared to create each cluster 
to be similar to the next; all clusters created were similar to each other in terms of their content. The 
algorithm appeared to partition the data into 8 uniform clusters with similar characteristics. 
The Two-Step clustering operation clusters a dataset into distinct groups; it does not attempt 
to predict an outcome. The Two-Steps that give the method its name operate as follows: 
1. A first pass compresses raw input data into a manageable set of sub clusters 
2. The second step employs a hierarchical clustering method that merges the small sub 
clusters into larger and larger clusters 
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The literature indicates that traditional hierarchical clustering methods are not well-suited to 
document clustering without modification (Zhao et al, 2005). Two-Step clustering belongs to a class 
of Agglomerative Algorithms, which have been shown to focus too closely on certain input 
variables, thereby prematurely and inaccurately placing items into a cluster where they may not 
ideally belong. Zhao et al (2005) present a new class of clustering algorithms, called, ―Constrained 
Agglomerative Algorithms,‖ that reduce this early stage ―tunnel vision‖ effect that introduces errors 
in clustering. Unfortunately, these new algorithms were not available for use in PASW Modeler 13. 
K-Means 
The K-Means algorithm produced seven clusters. These clusters resembled the original 
seven anomalies. Upon further inspection, however, the clustering algorithm was only able to 
coincide with the original anomaly categorizations 26 percent of the time. The value of Cohen‘s 
kappa was -0.015, a very low level of agreement between the clustering algorithm and the database 
administrators of the ASRS (Cohen, 1960). 
The K-Means clustering algorithm may have produced more desirable results than the other 
algorithms because of its iterative nature. Records are sorted initially by a set of ―starter clusters‖ 
created from their data. Based on the input values from each record, it is assigned to a cluster. The 
algorithm then ―re-checks‖ the record to see if it belongs in the cluster assigned to it. Steinbach, 
Karypis, and Kumar (2000) claim that K-Means clustering is suited for document clustering activities 
as it applies a seemingly more global approach than the other algorithms. K-Means clustering 
techniques do not focus on a single nearest neighbor variable; hierarchical clustering methods may 
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exhibit a ―tunnel vision‖ property by focusing too closely on one input variable. The nature of 
hierarchical clustering techniques is that they may ―lock in‖ a document‘s cluster early on in the 
clustering process, and it is impossible to correct this inadvertent early clustering operation as the 
algorithm progresses. 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  A n o m a l y  R e p o r t s  b y  C o n t e n t  A l o n e  
The dimensionality reduction classification activity was performed on 100 of the most 
commonly occurring words. This was done to make the effort as ―unsupervised‖ as possible, 
meaning that no investigator input was required to choose the inputs. The 100 words were 
transformed into a document difference matrix, and this matrix was reduced by the Diffusion Maps 
method described by Lafon and Lee (2006). The results of the classification are shown below. The 
diffusion maps algorithm creates large matrices, namely a pairwise distance matrix using MATLAB‘s 
pdist() command. This command has memory and computation limitations that become quickly 
apparent when large datasets are employed. To accommodate this limitation a reduced dataset of 
only 1,000 records was used. 
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Figure 49: Falling eigenvalues plot from dimensionality reduction 
The dimension reduction activity produced the above figure. The first nontrivial eigenvalues 
describe paths that the underlying structure of the data implies. The various vectors that describe the 
data in the forms of word presence or absence may follow common paths, and these eigenvalues 
describe those vectors that account for much of the underlying structure (Lafon & Lee, 2006). The 
fall-off of these eigenvalues dictates the dimensionality reduction and weighting of relevant 
eigenvectors.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
4
6
8
10
12
x 10
-3
E
ig
e
n
va
lu
e
s
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
4
6
8
10
12
x 10
-3

 /
 (
1
- 
)
139 
 
Figure 50: Diffusion map of the first three embedding coordinates 
The above figure displays the embedding of the first three diffusion coordinates. The data 
are clustered around these coordinates. These arrangements describe the underlying structure of the 
data. These data were employed in a k-means clustering algorithm to classify the anomaly records by 
words contained within them according to anomaly types. The above graph is a realization of a 
cloud of points where the rescaled eigenvectors are the coordinates. The above graph is a lower 
dimensionality representation of the data that reveals underlying structure.  
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Figure 51: Composition of the dimensionality reduction dataset – actual anomalies 
Table 21: Actual anomaly frequencies from reduced dataset 
Anomaly Type Frequency Percent 
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural 307 30.6 
Anomaly.Conflict 266 26.6 
Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem 153 15.3 
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter 82 8.2 
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude 76 7.6 
Anomaly.ATC Issue 71 7.1 
Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading 45 4.5 
Total 1000 100.0 
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Figure 52: Composition of the dimensionality reduction dataset – classification results 
Table 22: Category frequencies as created by k-means labeling 
k-means label Frequency Percent 
7 292 29.1 
4 255 25.5 
2 201 20.1 
1 146 14.6 
5 56 5.6 
6 33 3.3 
3 17 1.7 
Total 1000 100.0 
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The reduced 1,000 record dataset contained a representative sample of the data. The above 
figures and tables describe the data in terms of frequencies and visual distributions. After running 
the algorithm, a k-means labeling of the outputs was run to classify the records. 
The algorithm created a distribution of records very similar to the records classification 
distribution given by the ASRS database administrators. When comparing the output of the 
algorithm to the predetermined categories assigned by the ASRS database administrators the 
accuracy is 23.8 percent. These findings suggest that dimensionality reduction can be used to classify 
anomaly reports in an unsupervised fashion. By using more salient, relevant keywords in the process, 
this method could yield far better results as the algorithm focuses on using these features to classify 
the data. The fact that the frequencies of classification are so similar to classification activities 
performed by the ASRS database administrators suggests that the algorithm identifies features in the 
dataset. Most records had multiple classifications and contributing factors (however only the first 
one was used) and the dimensionality reduction activity may focus on a feature that was not used by 
the human ASRS administrator.  
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T a x o n o m y  o f  F a c t o r s  a n d  A n o m a l i e s  
Using the data garnered from the frequency analyses, text mining, and clustering, a 
taxonomy was created linking associations between Factors and Anomalies. The taxonomy 
comprises the differing anomaly types, with contributing factors located hierarchically below them. 
The taxonomy is presented in parts for clarity. 
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Figure 53: Taxonomy of deviation anomalies 
The above figure describes factors associated with deviations, including Procedural, Track / 
Heading, and Altitude Deviations. Weather was often a factor that would cause the automation to 
shut off or otherwise induce an intervention that deviated from protocol or assigned flight path. 
Many anomaly reports suggested that crew members would not follow recommendations from 
weather briefers, ATC, or other crew members. Missing an item on a checklist would lead to a 
failure of following established procedures. Aircraft equipment problems were often responsible for 
procedural deviations, often requiring human intervention in cases of automation failure. Finally, 
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inadequate knowledge of procedures or operations would lead to Deviations, as well as 
unintentional violations, i.e., situations where a pilot violated an established regulation without 
conscious knowledge. An example of this would be an unintentional airspace violation. Incorrect 
interpretations of procedures or communications would also lead to deviation anomalies. 
 
Figure 54: Taxonomy of aircraft equipment problem anomalies 
Aircraft Equipment anomalies were the result of equipment malfunctions or failures. 
Another contributor to anomalies included improper or lack of maintenance. Many anomaly reports 
contained statements about pilots troubleshooting equipment that had failed or was otherwise 
inoperative. Equipment operation problems such as lack of knowledge or employing the wrong 
function also caused anomalies. One anomaly report contained an anecdote in which removing a 
jacket inadvertently triggered a switch. The last factor, resource management on a micro level, 
described situations in which pilots were unable to operate aircraft equipment quickly enough to 
keep up with the rapidly changing situation. The rate of actions or operations performed by the crew 
(Actions per Minute) was insufficient for a given situation. 
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Figure 55: Taxonomy of conflict anomalies 
The most frequently cited factor for Conflict anomalies was loss of situational awareness 
(SA). This loss of SA was blamed on either focusing on irrelevant information, erroneous 
perception, or not perceiving important aspects of the flight environment at all. Resource 
management is management of the aircraft environment, or ―staying ahead of the airplane‖ in pilot‘s 
terminology. This inability to properly manage and interact with all resources was attributed to high 
workloads, which could come from distractions such as equipment failures, personal issues, or 
interactions with other crew members. 
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Figure 56: Taxonomy of inflight event / encounter anomalies 
Inflight Event anomalies were associated with an inability to manage the cockpit 
environment. Workload and time pressure were cited as factors. In addition, many Inflight Event / 
Encounter anomalies were caused by unruly passengers with highly excited mental states. For this 
reason, pressure and emotions were identified as factors. 
 
Figure 57: Taxonomy of ATC issue anomalies 
The final anomaly type, ATC Issue anomalies, was often caused by breakdowns in 
communication or a complete lack of communication. In the General Aviation environment, this 
lack of communication was often the result of incorrect frequencies being used. Other factors 
included language barriers or high-traffic areas with many pilots attempting to communicate at once.  
147 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
A study of factors influencing the submission of anomalous pilot reports was conducted. 
The study was unique because it investigated the ASRS database, to investigate latent, active, and 
human factors contributions to incidents, not necessarily accidents. By examining a great number of 
records (127,776), new associations and interpretations were made. 
The study employed traditional statistical analyses, correspondence analysis, text mining, 
clustering, and dimensionality reduction activities to investigate what factors contributed to civil 
aviation anomalies. 
M a j o r  F i n d i n g s  
The study uncovered results that were similar to those of most aviation accident studies 
(Wiegmann & Shappell 2003, Edwards 1988, Wallace 2006). A vast majority of aircraft anomalies 
have been shown to be attributable to human error or human factors issues. However, these 
findings were narrowed and made much more specific, further illustrated by frequencies and 
distributions. New associations were uncovered that described which types of factors and anomalies 
typically occurred together, and the strengths of these associations were also found. Supervised and 
unsupervised data mining methods were also tested. The data supported the idea that concept and 
keyword extraction can be used to create predictive models, thereby automating future information 
extraction. The order of quality of results was greatest for the supervised analysis methods, then the 
semi-supervised, and lastly the unsupervised methods. Finally, it was demonstrated that 
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dimensionality reduction techniques can aid in classifying documents, as well as identifying 
minimum levels of fidelity in data required for successful classification. The taxonomy created from 
study findings described relationships between factors and anomalies. 
A c t i v e  a n d  L a t e n t  F a c t o r  R o l e s  i n  A n o m a l i e s  
Using keywords and concepts found in Wiegmann & Shappell (2003), categories of 
contributors to aircraft anomalies were created. These categories comprised leading causes or factors 
identified by the literature. The anomaly record corpus of about 127,000 records was mined, and 
counts of these categories were extracted. Words that were extracted but not belonging to any of the 
defined categories were placed into an ―Uncategorized‖ category. 
The most prevalent category found across all anomalies was the Unsafe Conditions category. 
Rule-based error categories were found more frequently than skill- or knowledge-based error 
categories. This contradicts past aircraft accident studies (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001), whether 
civilian or military, that employed the HFACS system; they found skill-based errors to be most 
prevalent. However, the present study was one that investigated anomalies, which may have 
conditions similar to those had by accidents –  though there are enough differences between the two 
to not constitute an accident. Perceptual errors were also not identified as frequently in the present 
study they were in accident investigations. 
Another interesting difference uncovered by the present study is that only four percent of 
records were identified as having elements that would constitute a violation. The studies by 
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Wiegmann & Shappell (2001) found that about 25 percent of aviation accidents contained some sort 
of violation. It is conceivable that, despite the ASRS‘ assurances to pilots that their information is 
confidential and not traceable, many pilots are still hesitant to report their own violation activities. 
The low occurrence of unsafe supervision is consistent with the Wiegmann & Shappell 
(2001) study, which also found low percentages of unsafe supervision in aviation accidents. 
Identifying unsafe supervision is difficult, as assigning blame to an entire organization rather than an 
individual has much larger consequences for aviation-related operations, especially if serious 
violations or oversights are found. 
Anecdotal evidence from Jack Hessburg during his presentations on running a fictional 
airline maintenance operation includes humorous accounts of organizations avoiding blame. Most 
airlines require blame to be assigned when an aircraft is delayed, be it mechanical, crew-related, etc. 
Stories exist in which mechanics, who are often the culprits for a flight delay or cancellation, will go 
to extraordinary lengths to assign blame to another organization. Airline line mechanics have been 
known to bribe van drivers to strand aircraft crew at the hotel or  to break off keys to the catering 
truck, giving them more time to fix the problem and to artificially create a ―crew delay,‖ or ―catering 
delay,‖ respectively (Hessburg, 2000). Data collection efforts such as those of the ASRS or the 
Boeing MEDA (Rankin 1996) offer an anonymous reporting system to focus on fixing problems or 
reducing contributing factors within the aviation system, rather than assigning blame. 
As compared to the other types of Human Factors category issues, perceptual errors were 
not encountered frequently in this dataset. A probable explanation is that significant research and 
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technology improvements have attempted to overcome human limitations in the cockpit. Weather 
radar, strict regulations on avoiding areas of decreased perceptual information (clouds, darkness, 
etc.), and various aids and instruments all strive to decrease or eliminate perceptual errors 
(Leibowitz, 1988). Humans have become information integrators and processors within the cockpit, 
especially during commercial airliner operations (Mosier, 2010). The modern airliner has all but done 
away with ―fly by the seat of your pants‖ flying or creating situations that require immediate action 
or feedback. Such information processing activities do not require fast reflexes or immediate 
responses where perceptual errors may occur due to time pressure. 
D i s c u s s i o n  o f  L a t e n t  a n d  A c t i v e  F a c t o r s  
Many of the document associations discovered in the category web activity reinforced the 
associations found in the literature, in the correspondence analysis activity, and in the cross 
tabulation analysis. The categories differed from the factor and anomaly classifications studies 
because they were slightly less rigid, and did not require a human to classify different data. These 
were ―semi-supervised,‖ as a human analyst specified the terms to search for in the record corpus. 
Skill-Based and Rule-Based category types were associated with each other, and less so with 
Knowledge-Based categories. This is supported by Reason‘s (1990) explanation that Skill-Based and 
Rule-Based errors are similar in that they share a control mode that is does not exist for Knowledge-
Based errors. Rasmussen (1986) defines Skill-Based and Rule-Based errors as having a feed-forward 
control element that is based on familiar and ingrained internal models of the environment. The 
category web supports the theory that Skill-Based and Rule-Based Errors are more similar to each 
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other than they are to Knowledge-Based errors. 
The Knowledge-Based category web suggests that they occur on their own, when the pilot is 
in unfamiliar or unknown circumstances. They are highly associated with Unsafe Conditions, and 
less so with Weather and Violations. This association supports feedback theories of Knowledge-
Based errors; where the individual encountering the error must employ slower, more intensive 
cognitive processing to solve the problem (Reason 1990). It is highly likely that these errors would 
be encountered in situations where troubleshooting activities were also present. 
Perceptual Errors were associated with Unsafe Conditions and Weather. These two 
categories are likely interrelated, as Weather can lead to Unsafe Conditions. Somewhat surprisingly, 
associations were strong with Rule-Based errors. This may be because perceptual errors can fool a 
pilot into taking incorrect actions, or making wrong decisions due to inaccurate or misrepresented 
information. An inaccurate reading of a heading or altitude indicator could lead a pilot to take an 
unnecessary action, albeit one that is deemed correct by higher level training and ingrained 
behaviors. 
There were strong associations between Unsafe Supervision and Violations, but these two 
categories seem intuitively related, and no novel associations are uncovered in this particular 
category web. 
The Violations category had strong associations with Unsafe Conditions and Rule-Based 
Errors. These associations were reinforced because Violations usually cause unsafe conditions, and 
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also require a decision to commit them. 
Aircraft Issues were associated with Unsafe Conditions, as equipment malfunctions often 
lead to unsafe conditions. The other associations were too weak and trivial to mention. 
Weather was associated with Unsafe Conditions and Rule-Based Errors. Often in general 
aviation, a conscious decision is made to proceed into inclement weather, despite training and 
repeated instructions and notices to pilots to avoid such conditions. There is often pressure to 
maintain the flight plan or to make a landing to keep a schedule. Rapidly changing weather 
conditions can cause a sudden loss of visibility, decrease aircraft performance, or otherwise lead to 
Unsafe Conditions.  
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D i m e n s i o n a l i t y  R e d u c t i o n  f i n d i n g s  i n  I d e n t i f y i n g  
I m p o r t a n t  C o n c e p t s  
The diffusion maps operation was in agreement with pre-established categories of Anomaly 
reports 23.8 percent of the time. This classification scheme operated on completely unsupervised 
data. 
Unsupervised diffusion map operation on 100 words 
Dimensionality reduction was performed using the Diffusion Maps algorithm within code 
freely distributed by Ann Lee (2010). The algorithm demonstrated a limited ability to classify records 
simply based by word frequencies. This operation can be greatly improved with appropriate 
selection of words, as their meanings were not considered for the extraction process. This method 
was completely unsupervised. 
S t u d y  L i m i t a t i o n s  
The study limited the number data sources to a single large repository, the NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System. This repository contained only voluntary reports submitted by pilots flying 
both private and commercial operations. No military data was included in this dataset. The database 
was chosen because the literature suggested that, aside from NASA‘s internal metrics and monthly 
publication summarizing relevant, current anomalies with commentary, no large-scale analysis had 
been conducted on the data. 
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The encoded nature of the ASRS database, with its many abbreviations, excluded the 
possibility of a context-link analysis using a traditional dictionary. The data would have had to be 
decoded; this was deemed unfeasible due to the number of encoded terms. In addition, much of 
aviation terminology is rife with acronyms, abbreviations, and non-standard technical terms. A 
context analysis, though very powerful, is usually limited to full-text sources such as web pages and 
interview or survey data. 
In order to provide the widest breadth of data for the present study, all available anomaly 
data was analyzed. The data was not partitioned by any means, such as by date, type of operation, or 
type of aircraft. It is possible and very likely that there are underlying patterns within sections of the 
data. Anomaly types and frequencies for large airline operations, for example, will be different than 
they are for student pilots or recreational flights. These types of underlying patterns were not 
discovered. Future studies might investigate whether anomaly types and frequencies changed over 
time, as this was deemed beyond the scope of the present study. The overarching research objective 
was to have as much data as possible for model creation, text mining, clustering, and dimensionality 
reduction activities. 
To reduce noise by eliminating infrequently occurring anomalies, not all anomaly types were 
analyzed. The top seven most frequently occurring anomalies were studied. The other anomaly data 
were discarded. There may have been additional insights or categorizations made based on these 
additional anomaly types. The decision to discard these data was due to the fact that these additional 
anomaly types added noise, because few records were associated with these less frequently occurring 
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anomaly types, and because the ability to build predictive models was thereby drastically reduced. To 
account for this, no factor data was discarded. All factors were kept, no matter how low their 
frequency of occurrence was. 
The study relied heavily on the use of SPSS r17 and IBM PASW Modeler 13. These two 
software packages are made to work with each other. However, any inherent flaws or biases in these 
two applications would be sustained throughout most of the analysis. Results were not compared to 
those from another package. 
The diffusion maps aspect of the study did not have an official, well-developed software 
application. Diffusion maps for document clustering are a relatively novel idea at the time of this 
study; most other studies that classified documents had fewer numbers of larger documents 
containing full text. Of those studies, the classifications were usually binary in nature. Other studies 
also reported limited success in classifying documents with diffusion maps; e.g., Underhill (2007) 
reported a 27 percent accuracy rate. The rate reported in this study was 23.8 percent using a 
completely unsupervised input dataset. Records from the ASRS dataset usually had multiple 
classifications, and it is entirely possible that the unsupervised classification algorithm focused on a 
different feature or identified a feature that the human classifier did not. 
The techniques used to create the document difference matrices were not exceedingly 
sophisticated. Dimensionality reduction performs best with large samples of data, while the method 
used to handle the vectors of word presences was insufficient. Microsoft Excel was used for the 
task, and the software‘s limits were quickly reached when attempting to create a matrix sufficient to 
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encompass the 100 columns of words and 127,776 rows of text records. A reduced dataset of 1000 
records was used in its stead. 
F u t u r e  S t u d i e s  
Future studies in this area might investigate partitioned data to identify additional 
opportunities for insight that could be gleaned from focusing on specific areas or eras of aviation. 
Other databases, ones not limited to aviation, could also be used. Many organizations employ 
feedback systems and surveys, and these domain-specific text records could be analyzed in a similar 
fashion. 
Other dimensionality reduction techniques could also be employed. There are many 
techniques, both linear and nonlinear, that can be applied once data is properly encoded. One 
technique often cited in the literature was Principle Component Analysis PCA; it was not employed 
in this study. Additionally, the method of encoding anomaly reports could be altered to generate 
better results, or else a more sophisticated or better-equipped tool for dimensionality reduction 
could be employed. A software package that could encode raw text, apply the appropriate 
dimensionality reduction, and suggest or perform appropriate analyses on the output would be 
highly beneficial to this and other domains employing Literature Based Discovery (LBD). 
This study dealt with highly encoded data. To perform contextual analysis, the data would 
have to be decoded or an appropriate dictionary created. Thoroughly decoding the data is likely to 
be a better alternative. Contextual link analysis could explore relationships between meanings within 
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anomaly reports, thereby revealing additional insight not uncovered by database administrators or 
maintainers. 
Finally, this study employed unsupervised, semi-supervised, and supervised approaches. The 
approaches that provided the most meaningful results were those that were supervised by a human 
analyst. Future studies could develop wholly unsupervised methods and techniques. The method of 
performing keyword extraction was highly rudimentary, especially for the dimensionality reduction 
element of the study. Future studies may perform more in-depth and comprehensive keyword 
extraction, in order to create the most accurate possible relationships and associations, as well as 
providing a richer feature set for the dimensionality reduction activity to act upon. 
F i n a l  T h o u g h t s  
Although the possibility of achieving a perfect safety record and zero percent accident rates 
for the aviation industry is highly unlikely, it is necessary to reduce the current accident rate to 
accommodate the up and coming drastic increases in worldwide air traffic. The aviation market 
demands steady increases in performance and safety, and only through diverse, multidisciplinary, 
and systematic employment of findings from studies such as these will this demand be realized. 
Sheridan (2010) describes that changes to engineering itself are necessary; claiming that engineers are 
often focused on designing things, when really their focus should be designing relationships to people. It 
is this kind of thinking that often results in the ―wild, unpredictable, organic‖ human to be blamed for 
incidents rather than the orderly and digital technology. Understanding that the human can also be 
the savior of the system and designing with the intention of exploiting these ―saving features‖ 
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should be the focus of design, training, and research. Only through collaboration across disciplines 
and integration of meaningful findings can powerful, self-correcting, and sustainable practices 
emerge that will guide the aviation field into its exciting future. 
159 
APPENDIX A: MISCELLANEOUS FIGURES 
 
Modeling Software Screenshot  
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MATLAB Software Screenshot  
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Typical ASRS Record 
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APPENDIX B: CATEGORY RESOURCES 
Term Match Type 
intxn Entire Term Violation 
deviated Entire Term Violation 
drunk Entire Term Violation 
exceeded Entire Term Violation 
inebriated Entire Term Violation 
over the legal limit Entire Term Violation 
over the limit Entire Term Violation 
overspeed Entire Term Violation 
too fast Entire Term Violation 
too low Entire Term Violation 
violated Entire Term Violation 
violation Entire Term Violation 
error Entire Term Skill-Based 
forgot Entire Term Skill-Based 
oversight Entire Term Skill-Based 
pulled the wrong Entire Term Skill-Based 
pushed the wrong Entire Term Skill-Based 
slip Entire Term Skill-Based 
the incorrect 
button Entire Term Skill-Based 
the incorrect 
switch Entire Term Skill-Based 
turn Entire Term Skill-Based 
wrong button Entire Term Skill-Based 
wrong switch Entire Term Skill-Based 
crm Entire Term Rule-Based 
indications Entire Term Rule-Based 
clred Entire Term Rule-Based 
confusion Entire Term Rule-Based 
decision Entire Term Rule-Based 
i was sure Entire Term Rule-Based 
mistake Entire Term Rule-Based 
under the 
impression Entire Term Rule-Based 
we were sure Entire Term Rule-Based 
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wrong idea Entire Term Rule-Based 
wrong impression Entire Term Rule-Based 
wrong plan Entire Term Rule-Based 
manual Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
info Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
supplemental info Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
attempt Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
question Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
student Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
did not know Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
no knowledge of Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
was not familiar Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
was unfamiliar Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
were not familiar Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
were unfamiliar Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
were unsure Entire Term Knowledge-Based 
cruising Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
moderate Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
instructions Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
vfr conditions Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
taxi Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
clr of class Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
level Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
freq change Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
procs Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
contact Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
response Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
request Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
uneventful Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
inspection Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
clbing Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
talking Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
event Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
visual apch Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
callback 
conversation Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
apch Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
appropriate freq Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
arpt tfc pattern Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
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assigned rte Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
chked Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
clb Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
clbed Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
dsnded Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
dsnding Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
flying Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
lndg Entire Term Routine Behaviors 
missed apch Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
assistance Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
strong odor Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
hit Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
burning Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
injuries Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
medical Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
smoking Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
evac Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
paramedics Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
prob Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
odor Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
smell Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
smoke Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
conflict alert Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
dev Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
low fuel Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
oxygen masks Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
warning Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
return Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
damage Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
alert horn Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
alternate fuel Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
emer Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
evasive action Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
incident Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
problem Entire Term Non-Routine Behaviors 
snow Entire Term Weather 
icing Entire Term Weather 
imc Entire Term Weather 
low visibility Entire Term Weather 
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wx Entire Term Weather 
turb Entire Term Weather 
ifr Entire Term Weather 
sun Entire Term Weather 
visibility Entire Term Weather 
ice Entire Term Weather 
rain Entire Term Weather 
wind Entire Term Weather 
cloud Entire Term Weather 
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APPENDIX C: DIFFUSION MAPS OUTPUT DATA 
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Other Dimensionality Reduction Outputs – distances to k and clustering plot 
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APPENDIX D: COMPLETE TAXONOMY 
Unwise Decisions
 
Troubleshooting 
Equipment
 
Aircraft Equipment 
Problem Anomaly
 
Conflict Anomaly
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